Filling the Void:  Hizbullah's State Building in Lebanon by Davis, Peita
  
Filling the Void: Hizbullah’s State 
Building in Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
 
Peita Davis 
 
 
SID: 200435702 
 
 
 
 
GOVT IV Honours Thesis  
 
 
 
Department of Government and International Relations,  
School of Economics and Political Science 
University of Sydney 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
October 2007 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
This work is my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated 
this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of my work. 
 
 
 
Word Count: 19, 572 
 i
 Acknowledgements 
 
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Gil Merom for his patience and guidance in 
putting this work together, and Bob Howard and Leanne Piggott for their feedback and 
suggestions. A great deal of gratitude goes to my editing team, Sara Griffen, Rob Muir, 
and especially Maribeth Cole, whose meticulous editing helped smooth out some of 
those clunky sentences and offending typos. I would also like to acknowledge my 
fellow Middle East nerds, Professor Yahya Sadowski and Sarah Smiles, who provided 
willing and educated ears for me to bounce off my initial ruminations and analysis of 
Hizbullah.  
 
Finally, I would like send out my eternal gratitude to my parents Moira and Peter, and 
my partner Dave Vered. My parents have given me unwavering support throughout my 
endeavors - however crazy - I could not have done all that I have without their support. I 
thank you. And Davey, this year would have been impossible without your help. 
Whether it was technical support when I lost my thesis files, or rescuing me when I was 
completely overwhelmed by this project, you have been there every step of the way. I 
dedicate this thesis to you. I hope someday I can be your pillar of strength like you have 
always been mine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 Abstract 
 
Hizbullah is a militarised sub-state group that challenges Lebanon's authority by 
establishing a parallel power-structure within the state.  This thesis argues that the 
failure of the Lebanese government to provide for its citizens, particularly the 
disenfranchised Shiite population, has allowed Hizbullah to fill the void of Lebanon's 
absent government by creating a parallel state-like structure. Hizbullah’s state building 
is driven by domestic politics, as it strives to “democratically” restructure the political 
system in its favour rather than take the state by force. Hizbullah occupies a political, 
social and military position within Lebanon that extends far beyond any traditional 
definition of a sub-state group.  In analysing Hizbullah as a state-building movement, 
this thesis will shed light on the organisation’s autonomy, strength and objectives in 
Lebanon and also provide a holistic approach to further study of militarised sub-state 
groups. 
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
“When we build a strong, capable, and just state that protects Lebanon and the 
Lebanese, it will be easy to find an honourable solution to the question of the 
resistance and its weapons” 
 
Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, September 22, 2006 
 
 
 
 
he post-war decolonisation period, the end of the Cold War, and the effects of 
globalisation have led to the weakening of political authority in many states in 
the developing world. Many of these states have been classified as “quasi” (Jackson 
1990), “weak” (Migdal 1988), “failed” or “collapsed” (Rotberg 2004), and are the 
primary locales for instability in the modern world. The contemporary security 
environment is dominated by internal struggles for power, where ethnic, religious, or 
secessionist groups use “unconventional warfare” to challenge state sovereignty 
(Ayoob, 1995: 27). The proxies of the great powers during the Cold War were provided 
with international recognition and the financial means to enhance their formal status as 
sovereign states. Yet globalising influences of the post-Cold War world (such as neo-
liberal economic adjustments and transnational networks) have undermined the 
“propped up” sovereignty of new states while empowering militarised sub-state rivals 
(Kingston, 2004: 2-3). Consequently, the present era of globalisation has tipped the 
balance in favour of armed sub-state groups’ challenge to state authority and has 
profoundly altered the modern security environment. 
T 
 
Understanding the nature of militarised sub-state groups within weak states has 
important theoretical and empirical significance for conceptualising the modern state 
and the contemporary security environment. A dozen countries on the 2007 Failed State 
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Index contain “state-within-states”; areas that are essentially self-governed by sub-state 
groups but are within the borders of the sovereign state. In the former Soviet republic of 
Georgia, the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have built parallel 
governing structures. Both regions are heavily supported by Russian security forces and 
economic aid, and continue to reject the Georgian state’s authority (Failed States Index 
2007: 56). In Columbia, the narco-terrorist insurgency movement Fuerzas Armades 
Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC) controls a large swath of territory and provides 
basic social services and security to people living outside Bogota’s reach
 (Bejarano & Pizarro 2004: 99-118). These “state-building movements” pose a 
significant problem for international relations theory. The state-centric approach of 
much of international relations theory ignores the significance of armed sub-state 
groups - particularly those with state building characteristics - and prevents a thorough 
understanding of the modern security environment.  
 
The Islamist organisation in Lebanon, Hizbullah, exemplifies this problem. The 
organisation has been described as “the key to peace and tranquility in the Middle East” 
(Zisser, 2002: 10) - and yet it is not a state. It is the strongest external force that 
challenges the sovereignty and security of Israel; it is a key target of the USA’s “war on 
terror”; it is a primary player in the empowerment of the Shiite in Lebanon and beyond; 
and it is the most militarily powerful (and therefore threatening) political party in multi-
confessional Lebanon. Hizbullah also provides much-needed services, infrastructure, 
employment, and political representation to the Shiite community in Lebanon. 
Hizbullah therefore has certain state-like features, such as the monopoly over the means 
of coercion, infrastructure, and administration, but it is also missing key characteristics, 
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such as mandatory taxation1. The paradox between the “stateness” (Nettl, 1968) of 
Hizbullah and its position as an armed sub-state group poses a significant puzzle for 
international relations. Hizbullah has established a parallel state-structure, and yet it has 
not attempted to violently take over or separate from the state. Why then is Hizbullah 
asserting its authority and autonomy in the south of Lebanon and what are its ultimate 
aims? 
 
Many theorists have tried to answer these questions by analyzing Hizbullah’s military 
capacity (particularly in reference to its resistance to Israel) or the social function of its 
Islamic character. By focussing on the means and tactics of Hizbullah’s militancy, the 
organisation can only be viewed as an insurgent group that aims to either take over or 
separate from the Lebanese state. This paradigmatic view of Hizbullah concludes that 
the Lebanese government’s mediocre military capabilities and the absence of 
government institutions in much of Shiite-dominated areas would provide favorable 
conditions for Hizbullah to launch an attack on the state (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 80). 
This has not occurred, however, which indicates that Hizbullah do not “fit” into 
insurgent group theory.  
 
Other theorists (Hamzeh, 2004; Harik, 1996) examine Hizbullah’s social programs and 
service provision to gain understanding of one of its main sources of power - its support 
base. The failure of many states in the developing world to provide security or 
prosperity to its citizens has led resource mobilisation theorists to examine the material 
benefits of social mobilisation (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1216). Backed by Iranian 
financial and material assistance, Hizbullah has constructed a complete social-welfare 
                                                 
1 Generous funding from Iran shields Hizbullah from the state-like requirement of providing services in 
order to extract capital to fund war-making (Tilly, 1990). Accordingly, Hizbullah provides services as a 
method of maintaining support for its conflict with Israel and to legitimise its autonomy in the south.    
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system to provide for its constituents. These services have contributed to the popularity 
of the group, and have allowed it to skillfully penetrate Lebanon’s Shiite community 
(Hamzeh, 2004: 53-54). This paradigmatic view of Hizbullah provides the flip-side of 
Hizbullah’s military and insurgent character. However, both fields of existing literature 
are inclined to focus on one aspect of the group at the exclusion of the other. 
Hizbullah’s military identity was fundamental in its early years, however the group has 
recently shifted its focus from external militancy to grassroots state building and the 
insurgent group approach is not longer accurate. The civil society approach places too 
much emphasis on Hizbullah’s social function without recognizing the centrality of its 
militant identity. Consequently, this literature only provides a narrow depiction of the 
organisation and offers little understanding of its overall objectives in Lebanon. 
 
My analysis of Hizbullah overcomes the inherent weakness in existing literature by 
viewing the group’s coercive, social, and political characteristics holistically. I propose 
that Hizbullah has not attempted to seize power from the state forcibly because it is 
undertaking a process of state building. Similar to the development of state entities in 
17th century Europe (Tilly 1985, 1990), an organic process of centralising control, 
monopolising the means of coercion, and establishing a symbiotic relationship with the 
populace (in terms of taxation and service provision) is now occurring with some sub-
state groups inside new states (Ayoob, 1995). In other words, sub-state groups are not 
just challenging state authority (as insurgent theory suggests) but are muscling-in on 
state resources and gaining domestic legitimacy by creating a viable alternative to the 
existing state. By creating a parallel state structure that fills the void left of the 
ineffective Lebanese state, Hizbullah can attract supporters, increase its political weight 
in the country, and effectively “capture” the state from the inside rather than taking it by 
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force. The European state building experience has shown that organic state formation 
leads to the disappearance of some states and the survival of others (Tilly, 1975: 78-81). 
I argue that internal state-building movements such as Hizbullah may trump the 
authority of the Lebanese government and become the stronger state-like entity within 
Lebanese borders.  
 
This theoretical framework allows me to construct a comprehensive analysis of 
Hizbullah’s state building in Lebanon. Sub-state groups that develop state-like 
characteristics do so to either offer protection against a hostile government (which may 
be external or the central government itself) or alternatively, to meet the social needs of 
individuals (Spears, 2004: 27). Hizbullah has established state-like institutions to: a) 
provide protection from hostile Israeli forces, b) to advocate the needs of the 
disenfranchised Shiites, and c) expand its power and influence in Lebanon. In other 
words, Hizbullah’s state development is the result of domestic politics.  
 
To address the puzzle of Hizbullah’s state building in Lebanon, I will tease out the 
theoretical and empirical aspects of militarised sub-state groups, state building, and 
Hizbullah itself. Accordingly, this study is divided into three parts. First I provide the 
theoretical approach that underpins my argument: examining a) the early state making 
process that led to the establishment of the modern sovereign state; b) weak states in the 
international system; and c) the significance of sub-state groups.  This chapter examines 
the differences between the “organic” old states of Europe and the “imposed” state 
structures in the developing world, and the vulnerability of new states to internal 
challenges. Second, I investigate the inherent weaknesses in the Lebanese state structure 
that have allowed Hizbullah to carve a space for itself and establish a parallel state-like 
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structure. I then explore Hizbullah’s empirical statehood by analyzing its external and 
internal expressions of state building. Finally, I discuss Hizbullah’s objectives in 
Lebanon and how its state building process helps or hinders this goal. This section will 
provide a holistic analysis of both the process of Hizbullah’s state making, its 
relationship with the state, and the constraints Hizbullah faces when achieving its 
political goals. In sum, I will provide a comprehensive analysis of Hizbullah as a state-
building movement within the borders of the weak Lebanese state.  
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 ■ 1 ■ 
Studying Hizbullah: Assumptions and Approaches  
 
he Party of God, or Hizbullah, was trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in 
1982, and found its raison d'être in its resistance to Israeli occupation (1982-
2000). At the conclusion of the civil war (1975-1990), Hizbullah was exempt from 
disarming its militia force (all other militias were forced to disarm as part of the Ta’if 
Accord), and became the primary line of defence against Israeli occupation. Since the 
first post-war elections in 1992, Hizbullah has been part of the Lebanese political scene, 
with elected members in both municipal and national governments, and currently fields 
two out of twenty-four members in the Lebanese Cabinet (Shanahan, 2005). Hizbullah is 
also the main provider of essential services to war-ravaged areas across Lebanon. The 
organisation provides medical, financial, and housing facilities to its overwhelmingly 
Shiite followers, as well as maintaining hospitals, civil defence centres, and 
supermarkets. Hizbullah also owns and runs three major media outlets – al-Manar 
television, al-Nur radio, and al-Intiqad newspaper, which are accessible throughout the 
Middle East (Saouli, 2003: 6). These institutions, among others, employ thousands of 
people in regions of Lebanon that have poor employment opportunities and limited 
prosperity.  
T 
 
The Insurgent Group Approach 
One of the primary paradigmatic lenses through which to view Hizbullah is as an 
insurgent group. The Political Opportunity Structure school of social movement theory 
suggests that an oppressed peoples’ ability or willingness to mobilise is dependent on 
how open the political system is to challenge (McAdam, 1982: 48-51). In other words, an 
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insurgent group’s chance of success (defined as changing the status quo in favour of the 
challenger) is dependent on the strength of the state’s policing and military capabilities 
and the reach of government institutions into rural areas (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 80). The 
Lebanese government’s mediocre military capabilities and the absence of government 
institutions and authority in south Lebanon would thus provide favorable conditions for 
Hizbullah to launch a successful attack on the state. Nevertheless, Hizbullah has 
restricted its military activities to its external conflict with Israel and has not challenged 
the Lebanese state directly (Berkovich, 2006).  
 
Literature based on this approach tends to focus on Hizbullah’s military capabilities and 
foreign policy orientations, particularly its conflict with Israel. This approach was 
relevant and important when examining Hizbullah’s early years, when the organisation’s 
primary concern was its coercive ability and its resistance to Israel. However, Hizbullah 
has since then evolved and shifted its prime objectives to the domestic realm. Focussing 
on the means and tactics of Hizbullah’s militancy overlooks the organisation’s political 
and social characteristics and more importantly, its complex role in the domestic sphere. 
This theoretical approach therefore no longer provides a complete framework from which 
to understand the group.   
 
The Civil Society Approach  
The literature that focuses on the civil society approach, examining Hizbullah’s social 
programs and service provision, offers the flip-side to work on Hizbullah’s militancy. 
The failure of many Middle Eastern states (as well as states throughout the developing 
world) to provide security or prosperity to citizens has led resource mobilisation theorists 
to examine the material base of social mobilisation. In this regard, the appeal of social 
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movements such as Hizbullah may not be based on grievances (Gurr 1970) but on the 
presumed benefits the mobilisation can provide, such as political representation and a 
higher quality of life (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1216). However, these benefits have 
some cost; including military service, loyalty, political and allegiance (Zubaida, 1992: 4).   
 
There is some evidence to support this approach. Backed by Iranian financial and 
material assistance, Hizbullah has constructed a complete social-welfare system to 
provide for its constituents. These services have contributed to the popularity of the 
group, boosted the size of its constituency, and allowed it to skillfully penetrate 
Lebanon’s Shiite community (Hamzeh, 2004: 53-54). A survey conducted in 1993 found 
that forty-four percent of Shiites sampled of high socio-economic status indicated 
affiliation with Hizbullah, while fifty-three percent of those in the medium and forty-
seven percent of the low category were also Party of God followers (Harik, 1996: 53-54). 
The fact that Hizbullah helps people lead the “good life” by providing social 
infrastructure and public services is a fundamental motivation for its support. However, 
the civil society approach primarily focuses on the communal interests of the Shiites and 
disregards the interdependent relationship between Hizbullah’s military and social 
character. Although it has shifted its focus to the domestic realm since the end of the civil 
war, Hizbullah has never lost sight of its foreign policy and military objectives. 
Therefore, resource mobilisation theory alone cannot explain Hizbullah’s evolution from 
a social movement to a state-building movement.  
 
The Holistic Approach to Understanding Hizbullah 
Insurgent group and civil society approaches tend to view Hizbullah in isolation to the 
Lebanese state, often exclude one or more “sides” of Hizbullah’s complex character, and 
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do not explain the organisation’s role in Lebanon today or its future objectives. Assessing 
the “gaps” in these narrow approaches raises two important questions: (1) if Hizbullah is 
capable of taking Lebanon by force and has the opportunity to do so, why does it restrict 
its coercive/military activities to an external enemy (namely, Israel); and (2), if Hizbullah 
has the means to be an autonomous political, social, and military entity why does it 
maintain political relations with the Lebanese state? I propose that the answers to these 
questions lie in state making literature and in viewing Hizbullah as a state-building 
movement. 
 
State building literature provides the most useful theoretical foundation for this approach. 
In the state making process from 15th to 17th century Europe, domestic instability was 
caused by internal struggles for power - where some political entities survived at the cost 
of many others (Tilly 1975: 84). A similar process is now occurring in weak or failed 
states in the developing world (cf. Ayoob 1995). Transposing the Westphalian state 
system onto new states did not create stability but sowed the seeds of chaos, and in some 
cases, destruction. The internal struggles between sub-state groups and the “legitimate” 
(but often imposed and unrepresentative) authority are indicative of a process of organic 
or natural state formation demonstrated by the European experience. There are, however, 
significant differences between modern and European state formation; notably the 
compressed time frame of development, the strength of the international state system and 
the “idea” of the state (Buzan 1991), and finally, the influence of external actors on the 
outcomes of domestic struggles. Nevertheless, I argue that internal state-building 
movements, such as Hizbullah, are substituting the weak and unrepresentative state by 
establishing parallel state-like structures. 
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I hypothesize that Hizbullah is going through a state building process inside Lebanon that 
is undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Lebanese state. Lebanon has oscillated 
between failure, collapse, and weakness since its inception in 1920, due to the power-
sharing system of government that institutionalised sectarianism (Shanahan, 2006: Ch 2). 
The subsequent disenfranchisement of the politically weak Shiite community has led the 
Shiites to transfer allegiance from the national government to Hizbullah. The Islamic 
organisation has replaced the state in terms of the monopoly of the means of coercion, 
service provision, infrastructure, and most importantly, legitimacy, in the Shiite-
dominated regions. I argue that this process is a state building enterprise that is 
stimulated by need – that is, to fill the void left by the absent state. The strength of the 
“idea” of the state and regional circumstances has influenced Hizbullah’s strategy in 
Lebanon, but the primary cause of its state building is rooted in domestic politics. 
Hizbullah is therefore challenging the state by “showing up” the state’s incompetence 
and creating a parallel power-base. 
 
I have deliberately focused this analysis on the domestic causes of Hizbullah’s state 
building, rather than the regional (external) or religious, because there is an overemphasis 
on the latter aspects of the group in much of the literature. Many scholars attribute 
Hizbullah’s behaviour as a response to the regional environment (Saouli, 2006; Khalili, 
2007; Zisser, 2006), yet the role of Iran and Syria have become less integral to 
Hizbullah’s foreign policy as the organisation’s state building has strengthened. The 
external expressions of statehood (namely its conflict with Israel) provide Hizbullah with 
the legitimacy for its monopoly of coercion, but it is primarily a Lebanese political entity 
with Lebanese needs and goals. The religious elements of Hizbullah’s role in Lebanon 
accounts for its Shiite identity (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002), but I do not deal with this issue in 
 10
Filling the Void: Hizbullah’s State Building in Lebanon 
depth because the organisation has been forced to temper its religious conservatism to 
cater for the secularised Lebanese community (Harik, 1996: 65). As I will illustrate, 
domestic politics are the driving force behind Hizbullah’s strategy and objectives in 
Lebanon.  
 
Definition of Terms 
An analysis of Hizbullah’s state building in Lebanon must begin with an explanation of 
the terms “militarised sub-state groups” and “state-building movements”. Sub-state 
groups are units inside state borders that operate beyond state control and challenge state 
authority (Holmqvist, 2005). Sub-state groups are below the state but still part of the state 
entity - they require the resources of the state to survive, including, support from the 
population, capital, and territory (Kingston, 2004: 2). This thesis deals with militarised 
groups, as the monopoly of coercion is a central component of state-building movements. 
When I discuss coercion, I am referring to both the military aspects of violence (in terms 
of guerrilla warfare, attacks, kidnappings and other military tactics) and the inherent 
threat of a militia or army that is outside the control of the governing state.  
 
I refer to Hizbullah as a “state-building movement” to emphasize the centrality of 
domestic politics in its strategy and to focus on the process of state building. Alternative 
definitions of such groups, including “state-within-states” (Spears, 2004), “de facto 
states” (Pegg, 2004), “proto-states” or “states-in-the-making” (Benjarano & Pizarro, 
2004: 107), implicitly imply the sub-state group’s objective - which is commonly 
restricted to secession or sovereignty. I argue that these objectives are not necessarily a 
factor of Hizbullah’s state building and I therefore refrain from using those terms. 
Jaggers (1992) offers a good working definition of state building. According to him: 
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State building can be usefully defined as the state’s ability to accumulate power. State 
building is the process by which the state not only grows in economic productivity and 
government coercion but, also, in political and institutional power. More precisely, in the 
power of state elites to overcome environmental, social, and political forces which stand 
in the way of their policy objectives (1992: 27).  
 
This definition refers to the state, but I apply the same concepts to a militarised sub-state 
group. The important element of this definition is the accumulation of power, which 
according to Jaggers, has three distinct “faces”: “(a) power as national capabilities; (b) 
power as political capacity; and (c) power as institutional coherence” (Jaggers, 1992: 27). 
When I refer to state power (or increasing power in the state), I am implicitly referring to 
these three components.   
 
Another term that must be defined is “new states”. I refer to new states in the context of 
modern state formation and the inherent instability they often suffer. I define “new” 
states as those formed during the decolonisation period. This includes the Middle East 
and Asia (1940-1959), Africa (1960-1966), and the former Soviet republics (1990s) 
(Sadowski, 1998: 177-179). These states are predominantly located in the developing 
world, which is also known as the Third World. I use the terms new states, Third World, 
and the developing world interchangeably.   
 
Methodology 
This thesis will test the hypothesis that Hizbullah is a state-building movement that aims 
to improve its power and status in Lebanon rather than separate from or take over the 
state. Two main research questions are covered. First, what characteristics are present 
that confirm Hizbullah is a state-building movement? Second, why is it taking the 
(arguably longer) path of state building to obtain power and status in Lebanon? I study 
Hizbullah in an attempt to shed new light on the clandestine group. As discussed earlier, 
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Hizbullah is an important player in the region and its actions have domestic, regional, 
and arguably international implications. It is a fundamental political and social force in 
Lebanon and it is therefore important to gain nuanced understanding of the group. 
Hizbullah has been an important feature of the Lebanese social and political landscape 
since 1982, but its state building began in earnest during the post-war period of 1990-
2007. This seventeen year period is the focal point of my analysis, however, I also refer 
to Lebanon’s history from 1920-2007 and Hizbullah’s war-time development from 1982-
1990 to put the group’s evolution into context.    
 
This thesis uses a qualitative research program and I have analysed data collected from 
primary and secondary sources. Some of the primary data in this thesis was derived from 
the participant observation (Devine, 1995: 137) I engaged in Lebanon 2005. I 
participated in protests, rallies and demonstrations after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri 
and the withdrawal of Syrian troops, traveled to Hizbullah-controlled regions in south 
Beirut and south Lebanon, and conducted interviews with academics, experts, and 
Hizbullah members. The information I gathered during this year prompted this thesis and 
provided some of the primary evidence I have used for my analysis. I have used this 
material because, unlike other primary sources, I am conscious of how it was collected, 
collated, and assessed.  
 
Other primary material I have relied on consists of news reports from Lebanese and 
international news sources, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), and 
International Crisis Group reports. I have also accessed the English translation of 
speeches, policies, and announcements from Hizbullah’s official English website, 
Moqawama.org. I have critically analysed these primary sources to provide evidence and 
 13
Filling the Void: Hizbullah’s State Building in Lebanon 
 14
depth to my argument. The secondary material I have used includes peer-reviewed 
journals, other university published texts, and books and journals from important authors. 
I have chosen these sources as they provide evidence, background, and quantitative data 
(such as opinion polls and demographic data) that I could not obtain from primary 
sources.  
 
I did face some considerable challenges in obtaining data for this thesis. One major 
challenge was a language problem. Most of the primary sources concerning Hizbullah 
and Lebanon were in Arabic, and I was unable to use this material unless I could find an 
English translation. However, the greatest obstacle I faced in compiling evidence for this 
thesis was finding publicly available primary sources that depict Hizbullah’s goals in 
Lebanon. Hizbullah is a clandestine group and it rarely publicly announces its objectives 
in Lebanon – the closest example of Hizbullah saying it is a state-building movement 
was at Hizbullah’s “victory rally” after the 2006 war (see page one). In studying 
Hizbullah as a state-building movement, I have therefore analysed the group’s actions 
rather than its words. However I was able to ascertain some of the group’s objectives 
from the interview I conducted with Hizbullah Media Representative, Hussein Naboulsi 
in 2005. 
 
 
 
 ■ 2 ■ 
 State Breaking as State Making in the Developing World 
 
he theoretical framework for this study is based on early state making in Europe 
and the instability of “new states” in the developing world. Conflict, failed 
governance, fractured societies, and militarised sub-state group are characteristic of 
post-1945 states. By examining the “weak” (Migdal 1988, 2001) or “quasi” (Jackson 
1990) states of the developing world in the context of state making in 17th century 
Europe, I argue that Hizbullah is undertaking a state building process in south Lebanon. 
The absence or weakening of political order can prompt alternate power structures in 
the form of state-building movements. As seen by Hizbullah, these state-building 
movements are becoming an organic alternative power structure by filling the void of 
the incompetent and unrepresentative state.    
T 
 
State Making in Europe 
The development of the state format of political organisation was a lengthy, diverse, and 
organic process. State formation takes place when mediated rule, in which powerful 
kings rule through local powers, transforms to direct rule, whereby mutual 
interdependence between ruler and the ruled is developed through institutions and 
administrations. The emergence of states was sparked by unfettered competition 
between numerous actors over limited resources. Competition over land and produce 
created “private” dominions; whereby competitors protected their domains by raising 
local armies to guard against aggressors (Saouli, 2006: 703-704). Internally, rulers 
pacified the population through violence (or threat of violence), and crushed local rivals.  
When the state authority was no longer threatened by internal challenges it maintained 
its rule by providing security, infrastructure, and institutions to persons living within its 
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territory (Tilly 1975; Holsti, 1996: 91). In return for these services, states could then 
extract resources such as man-power and capital (through taxes) from their citizens to 
fuel the war-making required to solidify their territory (Cohen et al, 1981: 905). The 
state making of political units between the 15th and 17th centuries was influenced by the 
domestic and regional politics of their neighbours (Tilly 1990: 25). As states disarmed 
their citizens and increased their authority within their borders, a security dilemma 
ensued whereby the centralisation was seen as a threat to neighbours who then emulated 
the process in response (Holsti, 1996: 44).   
 
The European state building experience provides a historical “long view” of the 
development of the modern state. Between the fall of the Roman Empire and the French 
Revolution, Europe witnessed the creation of new sovereign political entities where 
empires once held sway (Ertman, 1997: 1). Some authors argue that this process of state 
making was the result of the relative continental isolation from imperial power centers, 
a common Christian culture, or the replacement of elite Latin with mass colloquial 
languages (cf. Holsti, 1996: 42). The development of cities that fostered capital 
accumulation (Tilly 1990) was also a critical source for the territorial state. However, a 
common feature of European state making was the role of war in centralising control. 
Tilly (1990) argues that war and the preparation for war acted as a central and necessary 
mechanism affecting the entire process of state formation (1990: 14-15). The more war-
makers penetrated society to fund their conflicts, the more they were forced to strike 
bargains with their subjects - transforming what had previously resembled extortion 
rackets into more accountable and institutionalised political entities (Tilly, 1985: 169-
191).  
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The centrality of war in European state making may shed some light on the function and 
trajectory of sub-state actors in weak states. In the 13th century, Europe was made up of 
approximately 500 distinct political units. By the 20th century, however, Europe had 
been reduced to 19 units consisting of either the modern nation-state or the 
multinational empire (Holsti, 1996: 42). The drastic reduction of political units indicates 
that there were a multitude of unsuccessful rivals for sovereign power. Free cities, 
principalities, bishoprics, and a variety of other entities were dissolved (violently) or 
consolidated to make way for a larger and stronger entity (Tilly, 1975: 24-25). This 
zero-sum creation of states was an organic process based on “the survival of the fittest”. 
Tilly warns that “major political transformations which occurred in the past may not 
repeat themselves in the present and future, and are very unlikely to present themselves 
in exactly the same way” (1975: 3). Nevertheless, the European experience illustrates an 
important fact; that “natural” state making involved the rise of some political entities at 
the cost of many others. This fact may have serious implications for Hizbullah’s state 
building in Lebanon (see chapter six). 
 
However, the process of European state development was not necessarily the same 
procedure that occurred throughout the world. State making in 17th century Ottoman 
Empire was characterized by incorporation and accommodation as well as the use of 
force. While local power in Europe was “crushed” during state making, it was 
“managed” in the Ottoman Empire allowing for coexistence between the political centre 
and the political entities on the periphery (Barkey, 1994: 1). State formation in 19th 
century Latin America also involved a combination of both coercion and incorporation 
(Lopez-Alves, 2000). European states were generally contiguous, and therefore high 
levels of coercion were needed to protect territory and crush internal rivals. In much of 
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the rest of the world, however, states generally constituted of a powerful core beyond 
which central authority dwindled. This allowed for greater levels of cooptation rather 
than coercion (Clapham, 2004: 78-79). The differing levels of coercion and cooptation 
are, interestingly, a feature of modern state making, and as I will illustrate, are also 
characteristic of state-building movements. 
 
Definitions of the State 
Academic literature emphasizes two primary approaches to defining the state: the 
empirical, and the judicial. In Weber’s classical empirical definition, states are 
“compulsory political organisations [whose] administrative staff successfully uphold the 
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force… within a given territory” 
(1978: 54). Tilly also emphasises the empirical aspects of statehood, noting that states 
are “relatively centralised, differentiated organisations the officials of which more or 
less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a 
population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory (Tilly, 1985: 170). Migdal (2002) 
views states as shaped by the image they project; they create the perception they are the 
controlling centers of society, but they are constrained by how effectively they fulfill 
their perceived obligations (Migdal, 2002: 15-16). Buzan (1991) also focuses on the 
empirical and ideational definition of the state, and suggests that the state contains three 
interlinked components: (1) the idea of the state; (2) the physical basis for the state; and 
(3) the institutional expression of the state (1991: Ch 2). Migdal and Buzan’s definitions 
provide looser empirical criteria for what constitutes a state which has interesting 
implications for the evaluation of Hizbullah’s role within Lebanon. 
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However, many states in the contemporary developing world (and in some cases the 
Western world2) do not meet some aspects of the empirical test of statehood. In his 
classic article, Nettl (1968) argues that states differ in their degree of “stateness”, in 
terms of institutional, intellectual and cultural markers. However, Nettl asserts that even 
low levels of stateness can be overcome by the “invariant” function of the international 
system (1968: 564). Jackson (1990) also recognises the impact of the international 
system on states, but claims that the international arena legitimises the statehood of 
political entities that would otherwise not meet the empirical criteria. These “quasi-
states” are states that are recognised as sovereign and independent units by other states 
in the international system, but that cannot meet even the basic means of empirical 
statehood - such as the monopoly of force over all the territory. Accordingly, some 
states (particularly post-1945 states) are not self-standing structures with domestic 
foundations, but are “territorial jurisdictions supported from above by international law 
and material aid – a kind of international safety net” (Jackson, 1990: 5). In other words, 
some new states are granted “judicial” statehood but they do not satisfy “empirical” 
statehood. As will be discussed below, the shift from empirical to judicial definitions of 
statehood has stimulated domestic instability in new states and given rise to militarised 
sub-state groups that challenge state authority. 
 
The difference between empirical and judicial statehood are best illustrated by 
comparing the state making ventures of Hizbullah and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). What differentiates Hizbullah from the PLO’s state building 
                                                 
2 For example, even in the United Kingdom, which satisfies the criteria for statehood better than most, 
there are substantial populations – predominantly in Northern Ireland, but also in Scotland and Wales – 
who do not accept their own membership of the state that claims them. There have even been occasions, 
again, most notably in Northern Ireland, where the power of the government over its territory was 
contested (Clapham, 1996: 12). 
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strategy is that the former focuses on the empirical aspects of statehood (such as service 
provision, monopoly of coercion, and taxation), while the latter was primarily motivated 
by judicial statehood (Jackson, 1990). From the mid-1960s the PLO became a distinct 
political actor; enjoying considerable autonomy and extensive recognition on the 
regional and international stages. Resistance to Israeli occupation was not stimulated by 
a desirable new political order, but rather was a means of creating a state in the western 
image and therefore a validation in itself. The PLO adopted the norms and “rules” of the 
dominant state system in order to grant it international recognition and mobilise external 
(rather than internal) support (Sayign, 2000: 204-206). Hizbullah, on the other hand, 
focuses on the grassroots, empirical attributes of a state and has built a strong and 
internally legitimate structure. The Party of God provides health and medical services, 
infrastructure, administration, and protection to its citizens, as well as providing 
political representation. These two cases exemplify the different strategies state-building 
movements can undertake and clearly illustrate the empirical and judicial definitions of 
statehood. 
 
The Failure of States in the Developing World 
The imposition of European state making models on new states in the 19th and 20th 
centuries created significant problems for groups within newly created borders. Ayoob 
(1995) contends that internal instability in weak states is akin to the violence and 
volatility that occurred in the early stages of state formation in 17th century Europe 
(1995: Ch 2). State making in the developing world, as the European experience 
demonstrates, can be defined primarily in terms of, “the primitive accumulation of 
centralised state power” (Cohen et al 1981: 902). In other words, the expansion and 
consolidation of state control over a population in a defined territorial space. This 
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process is often contested by internal groups who refuse to accept the legitimacy of the 
new governing body, which can lead to internal violence (Ayoob, 1994: 21).  
 
What is different from the European experience, however, is the influence of 
international norms of state behaviour. The notion of an ideal democratic welfare state 
and the expansion of communications technology (such as satellite television) have 
given populations in the developing world a heightened awareness of human, civil, and 
political rights. This factor restricts a state’s ability to use coercion as a means of 
centralising control and crushing internal rivals (Ayoob, 1992: 73). The inability of 
states to assert their authority and the inconsistencies between nationalist aspirations 
and the imposed state has made the developing world particularly susceptible to 
instability and internal challenges to state power. 
 
Weak States and State-Building Movements 
One feature of the weak, failed, or collapsed states in the developing world is armed 
sub-state groups who challenge state authority. When a state cannot centralise control or 
assert its legitimate right to rule, militarised sub-state groups can carve a space for 
themselves within the state’s sovereign borders. The state’s unwillingness or inability to 
provide for its citizens and its lack of social legitimacy have given rise to alternative 
forms of political order that, in some cases, are in sharp and favourable contrast to the 
ones above them (Kingston, 2004: 1). These state-building movements maintain an 
extension of force, territory, national identity and internal legitimacy, have the capacity 
to generate revenue, and develop and maintain administration and infrastructure 
(Spears, 2004: 17). Like states, state-building movements practice both external and 
internal expressions of statehood; including establishing alliances and external support, 
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and building a large and cohesive constituency (Rotberg, 2003: 10). State-building 
movements often enjoy considerable popular support. In the absence of a strong state, 
people are left to choose among state entities and social organisations that offer the 
most attractive benefits with the fewest sanctions (Migdal, 2004: 18). State-building 
movements are able to win over the population and achieve internal (but not necessarily 
international) legitimacy because of their ability to provide for the citizenry.  
 
Sub-state groups in the developing world can be understood theoretically as a “natural” 
or “organic” response to the failure of the modern state model. Prior to the 20th century, 
weak states that could not maintain even the basic empirical attributes of statehood, 
such as the monopoly of the means of coercion, would have been swallowed up by 
stronger powers (Tilly 1975: 84; Jackson, 1990: 23). If this organic process is translated 
to sub-state actors and weak states in the contemporary world, then the emergence of 
alternative power structures is of great significance. Tilly’s zero-sum model of 
European state development suggests that, depending on the weakness of the host state, 
conflict and internal war may push sub-state political entities toward statehood. In other 
words, if the judicial nature of statehood did not have the prominence it has today, then 
these sub-state units could organically form the community of states (Spears 2004: 17). 
If the developing world is undergoing a similar state building process to 17th century 
Europe, then armed sub-state political units can be understood as a fundamental step in 
that process. This theoretical framework will provide the foundations for understanding 
Hizbullah’s role in Lebanon and provide the possible trajectory of its evolution as a 
state-building movement.   
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The Place for a State Within a State 
 
ebanon has oscillated between weakness and failure since its independence from 
the French Mandate in 1943. The inherent weakness in the political structure of 
the country led to the collapse of the state and prevented full recovery after the conflict. 
This chapter will demonstrate how the weak Lebanese state has created a power vacuum 
that allows Hizbullah to carve a space for itself and establish a parallel state-like 
structure. Like many states granted independence in the de-colonisation period, 
Lebanon was established as a state before a Lebanese nation could develop. The country 
was carved out of Greater Syria by the French in 1920 and became home to Christians, 
Druze, and other religious minorities in the region. In 1943, Lebanon was granted 
independence and a power-sharing consociational political system was developed to 
incorporate the majority sects; the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims 
(Yiftachel, 1992: 323).  The sectarian basis of politics and society institutionalised 
family and religious loyalty over loyalty to the state. The inability of the Lebanese 
government to create a united nation led to the collapse of the state during the fifteen 
year civil war (1975-1990). Lebanon has recovered from the civil war but remains 
weak. National reconciliation has not taken place and the power-sharing formula 
continues to be incompatible with the demographic dynamics of the country. 
L 
  
1943 - 1974: Sowing the Seeds of Failure 
In 1943, Lebanon emerged as a classical consociational democracy, adopting the 
principles of proportionality, power-sharing, autonomy, and veto. This political 
arrangement was based on the unwritten ‘National Pact’ which shared power between 
the country’s main religious sects. The Pact stipulated that the President be a Maronite 
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Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Parliament to be elected on the 
basis of six Christians to every five Muslims. This confessional formula of 
representation was based on the first (and only) census taken in 1932 (Maktabi, 1999). 
The National Pact also stipulated that the key positions in the government, such as the 
highest judicial position, Army Commander, and the head of intelligence and internal 
security, would be filled by Maronites (Krayem, 1997: 412). This sectarian-based 
political system meant that the production of political elites began within the sect but 
soon became inter-sectarian struggles as elites competed on a national level. The power-
sharing agreement institutionalised sectarian rivalries and prevented the establishment 
of a unified Lebanese political community.  
 
Demographic changes and growing resentment between the haves and the have-nots 
eventually put pressure on the Maronite-biased distribution of power. Before the 
outbreak of civil war, Lebanese politics had the appearance of democracy but had little 
substance. Elections took place regularly and a large measure of freedom was enjoyed 
by the population, yet much of political life was overshadowed by a “general disregard 
for the law and the absence of basic norms and rules of the game among its participants” 
(Barak, 2003: 313). In a typical ethnic security dilemma (Posen, 1993), leaders of 
sectarian communities feared domination by one another and used the power-sharing 
system to preserve their power. Corruption, intimidation of voters, and occasionally, 
assassination of political leaders, were a common feature of election periods (Barak, 
2003: 313). 
 
Political inter-sect rivalries were exacerbated by the economic disparities between the 
different Lebanese sects. In the early years of independence, the Maronites had higher 
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literacy rates and held higher ranking jobs than their Muslim counterparts because they 
had greater access to government resources. By 1958, seventy-nine percent of Shiite, 
fifty-nine percent of Sunni, and fifty-one percent of Druze Muslims were illiterate, 
compared to forty-two percent of Maronites (Kliot, 1987: 58). In the 1960s, the poverty 
belt of economic migrants on the outskirts of Beirut and southern Lebanon (both 
predominantly Shiite areas – see Appendix 2) had death rates two or three times higher 
than the national average. Muslim regions were also provided with fewer services, 
infrastructure, and development projects (Kliot, 1987: 70). The economic disparity 
between the sectarian communities intensified internal divisions and put pressure on the 
existing consociational system. 
 
In 1958, Lebanon experienced its first taste of sectarian-based conflict. The Lebanese 
Muslims, who were sympathetic to the Pan-Arab ideology of Egypt and Syria, called for 
a more favourable position in Lebanon’s power-sharing system. The Christians resisted 
this pressure and the country suffered some months of instability. The conflict between 
the revisionist Muslims and the “status quo” Christians halted before the collapse of the 
state - however the fundamental causes of conflict went unchallenged. (Saouli, 2006: 
709). By the 1970’s, structural changes occurring in Lebanon and the region upset the 
Maronite-Sunni political balance and created a multipolar political struggle that was 
inherently unstable (Waltz, 1988: 622). First, there was a demographic shift in the 
favour of the Muslims, who became the majority3 (Shanahan, 2006: 2-3). Second, the 
Shiites became increasingly resentful of their disproportional representation in the 
power-sharing arrangement and began to mobilise politically (Norton, 1999: 6-9). 
Finally, interference from external players, such as the Palestine Liberation 
                                                 
3 Current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) figures give the Muslims a majority of 60 percent 
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html).  
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Organisation (PLO), Syria, Israel, Egypt, and the great powers further exacerbated the 
power-sharing system. The weakness of the Lebanese state permitted the heavily armed 
PLO to create a state within a state (after their expulsion from Jordan in 1970), which 
further drove a wedge between the Christian and Muslim Lebanese (Saouli, 2006: 70). 
In sum, the inability (or unwillingness) of the Lebanese government to revise the 1943 
National Pact to reflect the demographic and economic developments in the country, 
coupled hostile foreign interference, sowed the seeds of a total collapse of the state.  
 
1975-1990: The Collapse of the State 
Lebanon’s political, social, economic, and ideological tensions ultimately exploded in a 
protracted civil war from 1975 to 1990. The war in Lebanon was fought over a number 
of issues including the balance of power in government, the role of armed Palestinian 
groups, the redistribution of wealth, and Lebanon’s foreign policy orientation (either 
“Arab” or “Western”) (Haddad, 2002: 292). Militias from all sects constructed service 
institutions and autonomous militarised zones to maximize the economic opportunities 
created by war, to increase their domestic influence, and to take control of the state 
(Picard, 2000: 292-293). The failure of the Lebanese state to provide protection to its 
citizens forced the Lebanese to turn to their community’s warlords and militias for 
security (Rotberg, 2003: 6). In return, militia groups used coercion and predation to 
extract resources, such as manpower and capital, from the population. By the early 
1980s, confessional segregation reached its peak and the sectarian militias ruled the 
various regions in closed and semi-closed enclaves (Krayem, 1997: 416).  
 
However, Lebanon’s instability was not caused by internal divisions alone - its 
geographical location and regional environment also played a large part in the country’s 
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weakness. Regional factors including the Palestinian military buildup in Lebanon and a 
local resurgence of Arab Nationalism further aggravated the country’s sectarian groups 
(Saouli, 2006: 706). Lebanon’s location between Israel and Syria - two powerful 
countries at war - also exacerbated Lebanon’s internal troubles. External actors 
exploited Lebanese players to promote their own interests and regional balance of 
power conflicts were fought between Syria and Israel and their Lebanese proxies on 
Lebanese soil (Krayem, 1997: 419). Leaders of local militias sought external power and 
support as leverage to promote their own goals in the domestic arena, as well as to serve 
the interests of their benefactors (Barak, 2003: 310).  
 
The cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor exclusively 
external. The weakness of the pre-war power-sharing agreement and the economic 
inequality in the country was exacerbated by external interference and regional politics. 
Whatever the cause, the fifteen year civil conflict led to the total collapse of the 
Lebanese state. During the civil war, the state lost control of its borders and authority in 
many districts. Militias took over the role of the state and attempted to irreversibly 
undermine its authority (Picard, 2000: 294). Drug production and trafficking - which 
were previously kept in check by the government - proliferated. Shipments of small 
arms and heavy weapons poured into the country by land and sea through a host of 
militia-run ports (Barak, 2003: 309). By the 1990 conclusion of the conflict, 144, 240 
persons were killed and 197, 506 were wounded. Almost one third of Lebanon’s pre-
1975 population of 3.1 million had left the country (Barak, 2003: 308). While most 
players in the conflict laid down their arms and resumed their lives in the 1990s, the 
state’s recovery remained a challenge. 
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1991-2007: From Failure to Protracted Weakness  
The civil war was finally settled by the 1989 Ta’if Accord; a document designed to 
regulate the conflict of interests between the various sects. The Accord brought basic 
modifications to the power-sharing system but it did not alter the fundamental character 
of the National Pact. Sectarian proportionality remained, but the proportion of Muslims 
to Christians in the parliament increased to 1:1 rather than the 6:5 in favour of the 
Christians (Krayem, 1997: 414). Essentially, the agreement implemented a change in 
the Lebanese political structure to account for the new balance of power among the 
communities; namely, the decline of the Maronites and the advance of the Sunnis 
(Haddad, 2002: 293). The Accord ended sectarian violence in the country but it failed to 
promote cooperation among Lebanese groups. The reproduction of the Lebanese 
confessional system, albeit with a new formula that allocated more power to the 
Muslims, institutionalised the multipolar pre-war political environment (Khalaf, 2003: 
116-11). 
 
One of the major consequences of the civil war was the increase in family loyalties and 
communal solidarities at the cost of the state. By 1990, more than 1.2 million Lebanese, 
about thirty percent of the population, had been uprooted from their homes and 
communities. Massive population shifts, accompanied by the reintegration of displaced 
groups into more homogeneous areas, reinforced communal solidarity and brought 
about the disintegration of inter-sect interaction (Haddad, 2002: 297).  The results of a 
1983 study concluded that seventy percent of respondents restricted their daily 
movements to the communal areas in which they live. The authors of the poll concluded 
that, “the psychological barriers accompanying sociocultural differences [in Lebanon] 
are becoming deeper and more in-grown” (Khalaf, 2003: 127). Evidence suggests that 
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time has not healed these wounds. A 2000 survey revealed that high levels of distrust, 
misperception, suspicion, and fear characterize relations between various Lebanese 
sectarian groups (Haddad, 2002: 304). The lack of a common national identity and the 
absence of a reconciliation process indicate that the inherent fractures in Lebanese 
society have persisted after the war.  
 
Lebanon has regained its status as a legitimate international player despite the 
fundamental flaws and weaknesses in the state (Barak, 2003: 328). The Lebanese 
economy has never recovered its pre-1975 status, and internal and external factors 
continue to influence Lebanon’s ability to function as a state.  Lebanon currently has 
over thirty billion dollars of public debts which, according to International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) 2006 figures, is 174.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - one of 
the highest debt to GDP ratios in the world (IMF, 2006: 9). The entry of militia leaders 
into the political system institutionalised confessional nepotism and led to a virtual 
paralysis of the administrative authorities (Krayem, 1997: 427). The thirty-year Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon (1975-2005) provided the “coercive” function in Lebanon and 
reduced the threat of a security dilemma between rival militias in the post-war years. 
This provided the stability for Lebanon to function internally and internationally as a 
state - but at a cost. Lebanon was restricted by Syria’s omnipresent control and it 
arguably became a mere satellite of the Assad regime (Rotberg, 2004: 19). These factors 
provide a snapshot of the weakness of the Lebanese state. As chapters four and five will 
demonstrate, these weaknesses have allowed Hizbullah to carve a space for itself and 
establish a parallel state-like structure at the cost of government authority. 
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Hizbullah’s State Building: The External Dimension 
 
izbullah has been battling the United States, its western allies, and Israel since 
its inception as a military force in 1982. Backed by alliances with Iran and 
Syria, Hizbullah uses these external conflicts as a means of solidifying its territory, 
autonomy, and monopoly of coercion in the south of Lebanon. The external expression 
of statehood allows Hizbullah to demonstrate its military power to domestic and 
regional audiences, increase its legitimacy as a defender of “Arab honour”, and play a 
role in international politics. This chapter will examine Hizbullah’s motivation and 
methods for its external expression of statehood. By displaying its military might, 
enacting independent foreign policy, forming advantageous alliances, and engaging in 
regional politics, Hizbullah demonstrates international influence normally reserved for 
sovereign states. This function of Hizbullah illustrates its state-like character and 
provides an important foundation for its domestic survival in Lebanon. 
H 
 
Resistance to Israel: the Root of Hizbullah’s Statehood 
Resistance to Israeli intervention in Lebanon is Hizbullah’s formal raison d’être, and 
provides the means to demonstrate its strength, assert its authority, and solidify its area 
of control. Emerging from the 1989 Ta’if Accord in the privileged position of the only 
sectarian militia permitted to retain arms, Hizbullah’s autonomy of coercion has 
provided the means for its external expression of statehood. If war is considered the 
midwife of state making (Tilly, 1985) then Hizbullah’s resistance to Israel provides the 
pretext to strengthen its state building by engaging in regional affairs. The conflict gives 
Hizbullah the “cause” to increase its arsenal and strengthen its army. The Party of God 
is reported to have as many as 10,000 Katyusha rockets and has recently used (in the 
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2006 war) Iranian supplied advanced anti-ship and anti-tank missiles that have a range 
of ninety-five kilometres (McGregor, 2006: 6). The organisation fired 3,790 rockets into 
Israel, hitting 901 communities and killing forty-two Israeli civilians. This served as a 
demonstration of the “reach” of its coercive ability, which increased the group’s 
standing as an autonomous state-like political player (Makovsky & White, 2006: 42). 
The conflict with Israel not only gives Hizbullah the pretext to build up its army, but it 
allows the group to expand its territorial base and solidify its state-like borders. In the 
aftermath of the 2006 conflict, Hizbullah began buying up tracts of land owned by 
Christians and other non-Shiite in southern Lebanon. The land grab is seen as an effort 
by Hizbullah to rearm and fortify the strategically important areas in the south to 
strengthen its coercive ability against Israel (The Sunday Telegraph, 14 Aug, 2007).   
 
The Party of God’s primary external expression of statehood is its ability to make 
unilateral foreign policy decisions. By preventing the deployment of government troops 
in the south and engaging independent foreign policy, Hizbullah can assert its authority 
and behave like a sovereign state. The organisation’s decision to kidnap two Israeli 
soldiers that sparked the thirty-four day conflict was taken unilaterally, and, like most of 
its military operations with Israel, Hizbullah offered no consultation or warning to the 
Lebanese government (Fakhoury-Muhlbacher, 2007: 6). Hizbullah is therefore a 
parallel authority in Lebanon, which is indicative of its status as a state-building 
movement. The Lebanese state and the international community are unable to prevent 
Hizbullah’s independent foreign policy because of the organisation’s broad domestic 
support4, its military and social autonomy in the south, and the fragility of the sectarian 
 
4 There is no data that indicates the actual number of Hizbullah supporters, and estimating figures based 
on the number of Hizbullah members elected in municipal and national elections is not illustrative of 
Hizbullah support because of the sectarian restrictions in the Lebanese political system. However, 
anecdotal evidence and the size of Hizbullah staged protests suggest that “most” of the Shiite population 
support Hizbullah. (Smiles 2007). 
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balance in the country. As Mahmoud Qumati, a member of Hizbullah’s political bureau, 
said:  
[The current situation] will not change until the Shaba [sic] farms are freed, our 
prisoners released and our country is safe. We know the international community rejects 
these conditions, but the situation will last because there is no way to pressure us: a new 
war is unlikely and imposing an international siege on our movement is an old story for 
which we are well prepared (ICG, 2006: 7). 
 
This indicates that the organisation is in a comfortable position to maintain its 
monopoly over the means of coercion and undertake unilateral foreign policy as an 
external expression of its statehood.  
 
Nevertheless, Hizbullah has much at stake with its foreign policy decisions. Its place of 
prestige in the “Arab street” (as will be discussed below) and within Lebanon rest 
largely on how well the group performs against Israel and whether or not it is left 
standing after open confrontation. Hizbullah is therefore constrained in its foreign 
policy as it must balance its identity as a defender of Arab pride with the potential 
backlash of appearing to wreck havoc upon Lebanon. In an interview on Lebanon’s New 
TV on August 27, 2006, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah declared: “We 
did not think, even one percent, that the capture [of two soldiers] would lead to a war at 
this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11…that the 
operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not”5 (in 
Makovsky & White, 2006: 19). This admission of miscalculation, which is virtually 
unprecedented for an Arab leader, can be seen as a signal that Hizbullah fears loss of 
military legitimacy inside and outside Lebanon. While Hizbullah’s foreign policy is one 
of its more powerful tools for maintaining autonomy and expanding its state building, 
 
5 Despite billing the conclusion of the 2006 as a “Divine Victory”, Hizbullah suffered substantial losses in 
the conflict. The organisation is reported to have lost 300-500 fighters and thousands of rockets. Much of 
Hizbullah’s civilian infrastructure was also destroyed, including financial institutions and social service 
centres (Makovshy & White, 2006: 19).      
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the organisation must also be careful not to overreach and lose the domestic support that 
enables it to undertake state-like foreign policy.      
 
Advantageous Alliances: Hizbullah, Syria, and Iran 
Hizbullah has developed alliances with its powerful neighbours, Syria and Iran, to 
provide resources and support for its autonomy and ensure its domestic survival. A sub-
state group’s survival is dependent on its coercive or economic functions, and 
importantly, its ability to knit together regional alliances that provide support, 
protection, and guidance (Saouli, 2006: 709). Hizbullah’s state building in Lebanon has 
involved maintaining advantageous alliances with Syria, which until recently was the 
dominant external power within Lebanon; and Iran, its primary financial, military, and 
spiritual benefactor. Hizbullah was founded out of a joint agreement between Syria and 
Iran to allow the latter to send troops to Lebanon in response to the Israeli invasion. 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards organised, armed, trained, and united various Shiite 
groups into Hizbullah, and from that point onward, the organisation has become the 
beneficiary of generous support and ideological guidance from the Iranian government 
(Early, 2006: 119). Estimates put Iranian financial support to Hizbullah at US$100 
million per year since 1982 (Byman, 2005: 87). This financial support shields the 
organisation from one of the necessary attributes of state-building movements – 
economic independence – and has accelerated its success by “fifty years” from what it 
would have been able to accomplish on its own (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 14).  
 
Iran provides the organisation with financial support and operational guidance, yet 
Hizbullah’s relationship with Syria can be described as a double-edged sword. Before 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, Damascus’s tight grip on Lebanese politics 
meant every militia and political party in Lebanon was forced to bow to its will or face 
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political extinction. Syria permitted Hizbullah to maintain its arms at the conclusion of 
the civil war to use it as a cats-claw against Israel. At the same time, Damascus 
restricted the organisation’s freedom in the domestic arena by manipulating electoral 
lists and alliances during national and municipal elections (Saouli, 2003: 4). Syria also 
periodically tried to contain Hizbullah’s growing influence by force. The most dramatic 
instance occurred when the Assad regime killed 23 Hizbullah members in 1987 
(Norton, 2007: 72). Syria’s efforts to “divide and rule” prevented any one party in 
Lebanon becoming strong enough to deliver a knock-out blow to another. While its 
relationship may have been one-sided, Hizbullah safeguarded its alliance with Syria as 
the Assad regime protected Hizbullah’s monopoly of coercion in the south.  
 
Hizbullah’s strategic alliances with Syria and Iran have allowed the group to attain its 
present status and strength in the country. Its external allies have provided logistical 
support for its independent foreign policy, have allowed it to maintain its autonomy of 
coercion, and have enabled it to increase its relative domestic power. Yet recent 
political developments in the region have lessened Hizbullah’s reliance on external 
allies for domestic survival. Under Rufsanjani’s and Khatami’s presidencies, Iran cut 
funding to the group by seventy per cent (although estimates suggest that the 
organisation receives US $100 from the current regime) (Hamzeh, 2004: 63; Levitt, 
2005: 4). However, the organisation’s state building process has enabled it to become 
increasingly economically independent from Tehran.  Figures for Hizbullah’s income 
are not publicly available, but it is estimated that the organisation derives additional 
funds from the khums6 of its supporters, from donations from wealthy Shiite individuals 
in Lebanon, Africa, and South America, and from a network of financial and business 
 
6 The khums are a legally binding donation of one-fifth of one’s annual income to the Islamic ‘ulama’ 
(community). These religious taxes are arguably comparable to formal taxes imposed by the state 
(Hamzeh, 2004: 63-64). 
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investments in Lebanon and abroad (Hamzeh, 2004: 63-64). Hizbullah also allegedly 
receives funding through criminal enterprises, such as money laundering, smuggling, 
fraud, and the drug and diamond trades in South America and Africa respectively 
(Levitt, 2005: 6-7). While the cessation of Iranian funding would certainly hamper 
Hizbullah’s generosity to its constituents, the organisation’s independent financial 
enterprises would allow it to continue its state building process in Lebanon unhindered 
by its Shiite ally.   
 
Hizbullah’s external state-like activities have been emboldened by the decline of Syria 
in Lebanon. Syria’s power and stature in the region began a downward spiral with the 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and gained momentum following the death of 
Hafez al-Assad in June 2002 and the accession of his son Bashar. The death of Hafez 
removed a major obstacle from Hizbullah’s ability to expand its influence in Lebanon. 
The elder Assad had never met with the Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, 
and regarded the organisation as just another Syrian pawn in Lebanon. His son and heir 
Bashar, on the other hand, has met with Nasrallah numerous times and looks up to him 
as an admired warlord and experienced role model (Zisser, 2002: 7). The “friendly” 
relationship between the current Syrian President and Hizbullah’s Secretary-General 
testifies to Bashar’s weakness in the Lebanese arena - which culminated with the 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005 
(Hamzeh, 2004: 115). Hizbullah’s strategic alliances with Syria and Iran have enabled it 
to strengthen and expand its state building venture. Yet evidence suggests that these 
alliances are subject to the organisation’s “need” for external benefactors. The current 
political climate suggests that Hizbullah has increased freedom and autonomy in 
Lebanon and would thus be less likely to respond to Syria’s or Iran’s needs if doing so 
would jeopardise its own interests in Lebanon.  
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Status and Influence: Hizbullah’s Use of Regional Politics 
Hizbullah accentuates its reputation as the most successful Arab force in against Israel 
in order to increase its status and regional influence in the Middle East. The withdrawal 
of Israeli troops in May 2000 and the perceived “victory” of Hizbullah in the 2006 
conflict with Israel intensified regional acclaim of the organisation’s military ability. 
Much of the Arab world recognised that Hizbullah had managed what numerous Arab 
armies had failed to do – defeat the military super-power in the region. Large street 
rallies were held in Cairo and other Sunni Arab cities to show support for Nasrallah and 
his struggle with Israel in 2000 and again in 2006 (although Sunni regimes in Egypt, 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia were critical of Hizbullah during the 2006 conflict) (The New 
York Times, Jan 17, 2007). Hizbullah has made a concerted effort to “regionalize” its 
foreign policy to gain further acclaim and grassroots regional support. The organisation 
has incorporated the Palestinian issue on its military agenda, and often refers to the 
struggle across the border as equal to its mission in Lebanon. Hizbullah’s newspapers, 
and television and radio stations are accessible throughout the Middle East and 
continuously play propaganda films and “news stories” emphasising Hizbullah’s 
success as an Arab resistance force battling the regional “enemy” - Israel (ICG, Nov 
2002: 14). Hizbullah effectively uses its media outlets to reinforce its reputation as a 
powerful regional force in order to gain the prestige and status needed to strengthen its 
state building efforts.   
 
Interestingly, Hizbullah’s “victorious” conflict with Israel and other pro-western 
Lebanon-based factions has become an opportunity for other Shiite groups to boost 
symbolic capital with their supporters and further their own political goals. By 
demonstrating unity and solidarity with the powerful Lebanese group, other military 
factions can siphon off some of the prestige and acclaim afforded to Hizbullah. On 
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August 4 2006, thousands of Iraqi Shiites, mostly sympathisers of Muqtada as-Sadr’s 
al-Mahdi militia, went out in the streets of Baghdad to express their support for 
Hizbullah. The Iraqi Shiites carried banners emphasising an analogy between their own 
battles against US occupation and the fierce resistance put up by Hizbullah (Leenders, 
2007: 974). This use of Hizbullah’s identity to stimulate mobilisation is further 
indicative of the effectiveness of the organisation’s foreign policy and the important 
function it plays in gaining power in the region and at home. 
 
However, this prestige has not necessarily survived the current struggle between rival 
Islamic sects. The ascendancy of Iran (and consequently the Shiites) as a result of the 
fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of Shiite militias in Iraq has stimulated fear of a 
“Shiite crescent” from Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. As a result, some regional players have 
lessened their support for Hizbullah, who they see as a key player in the ascendancy of 
the Shiites at the cost of Sunni states. Jordan intelligence operatives have been trying to 
infiltrate Shiite groups to work against Hizbullah in the hope of preventing the “Shiite 
crescent”. Sunni Jihadist groups, such as Fatah Islami in Lebanon, are also reportedly 
aiming to eliminate the charismatic Hizbullah leader, Nasrallah (Hersh, 2007). 
Moreover, some Sunni religious leaders who harbour sensitivities toward Shiite Islam 
have issued fatwas against Hizbullah (The Daily Star, Aug 9, 2006). In effect, the 
increasing tension between the rival sects has led much of the Sunni world to view 
Hizbullah’s resistance to Israel and the west as an antagonistic element of a pending 
sectarian war. Hizbullah’s ability to manipulate, utilize, and consequently be affected by 
regional politics is indicative of its state-like character. Although not a sovereign state, 
Hizbullah’s foreign policy and international conduct reverberates throughout the Arab 
world and has far wider implications than merely in its capacity as a “Lebanese” 
resistance force. 
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All-Arab Identity: The Conflict with the US and the West 
Hizbullah began its military struggle in response to western interference in Lebanese 
politics during the civil war. This “resistance” to the US and the west is subsidiary to 
the conflict with Israel, yet it provides the group with an “all-Arab” identity that 
transposes its Shiite or Lebanese character. Since the early 1980s, Hizbullah has 
positioned itself as an opponent of US policy in the Middle East and especially 
Lebanon. Hizbullah managed to drive out the US and its western allies from Lebanon in 
1983 and has been connected to a series of notorious attacks on the US during the 
Lebanese civil war. These include the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut 
that killed 241 American soldiers, the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, and 
the kidnappings of Americans including journalist Terry Anderson and CIA chief 
William Buckley (Norton, 1999: 1). Hizbullah has consistently used anti-American 
vitriol in its public statements and is seen as the vanguard against western imperialism 
in the region. Taking his inspiration from the virulent anti-American statements of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Hizbullah has threatened and condemned the US for its 
pro-Israeli and anti-Islamic policies. One of the most persistent slogans that appear on 
banners and billboards throughout Hizbullah-dominated regions is “Death to America” 
(Jaber, 1997: 145-168).  
 
Hizbullah’s anti-American stance is fundamental to its efforts to “regionalize” its 
military identity. This is motivated by a desire to appease and maintain support from its 
anti-west allies (Iran and Syria), and to stimulate cross-sectarian support in Lebanon and 
the region. When Nasrallah faces political criticism for launching rockets into Israel, he 
accuses the government of being unpatriotic and bowing to “western powers” (Harik, 
2004: 77,153). Hizbullah’s identity as an “Arab” resistance to western imperialism has 
had greater salience during the post- 2001 “war on terror”. The US has tried a number 
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of covert and overt strategies (including the funding Sunni extremists7) to contain 
Hizbullah’s external and internal influence. It has coerced and encouraged the Lebanese 
government to pressure the group, and has cracked down on Syria (with the 
implementation of the 2003 Syria Accountability Act and UNSCR 1559 of 2004) to 
undermine Hizbullah’s primary logistical supporter (Byman, 2005: 62). These moves to 
undermine Hizbullah have inadvertently increased its legitimacy as an “Arab” resistance 
force and stymied any domestic or regional criticism the group may have faced. 
American pressure on the group has created an environment whereby other Arab and 
even Lebanese critics of Hizbullah are compelled to mute their criticism to avoid 
seeming to back the US (ICG, 2003: 2). In this sense, the US has bolstered Hizbullah’s 
reach in the region by perpetuating its identity as a weapon against American 
imperialism. 
 
7 Fearful that a politically powerful Hizbullah would bolster Iran’s reach and therefore weaken the US’s 
influence, America has interfered in Lebanese politics to tilt the balance in the favour of their Sunni allies. 
However a by-product of these activities is the bolstering of Sunni extremists. The US has publicly 
pledged the Siniora government one billion dollars in aid since the 2006 war, which has reportedly 
trickled into the hands of some Sunni insurgent groups in Lebanon. By attempting to undermine the Shiite 
threat in the country, the Lebanese government (and indirectly, America) have therefore bolstered Sunni 
terrorist groups and potentially exacerbated the local and regional Sunni/Shiite divide (Hersch, 2007).  
 ■ 5 ■ 
Hizbullah’s State Building: The Domestic Dimension 
 
izbullah’s role in Lebanon is best examined by analysing the domestic 
dimensions of its state building process. While the international aspects of 
Hizbullah’s state building provide both the “means” - in the struggle with Israel - and 
the “expression” - in terms of independent foreign policy - of statehood, the domestic 
dimension illustrates Hizbullah’s evolution into a state-building movement. The need to 
maintain domestic support has motivated Hizbullah to incorporate the well-being of the 
Shiites onto its state building agenda. This chapter will explore the domestic elements 
of Hizbullah’s state making. By analysing the military, social, and political components 
of Hizbullah’s state building, I outline the group’s complementary tactics of gaining 
support and increasing power in the domestic arena. The centrality of domestic politics 
in Hizbullah’s motives is often underplayed in the literature (cf. Jaber, 1997; Ranstorp, 
1997; Kramer, 1998), but this chapter will illustrate that Hizbullah is a uniquely 
Lebanese phenomenon whose state building is determined by the ebbs and flows of 
domestic politics.  
H 
 
The Instrumental Value of War  
The military mission of Hizbullah is central to the organisation’s world-view and 
practical agenda. Its foreign policy is used domestically to gain support as a champion 
of the Shiites and to threaten sectarian rivals who may challenge its autonomy. 
Hizbullah is seen as a heroic organisation in the eyes of its constituents, which 
stimulates the domestic support needed to pursue its military agenda (Zisser, 2002: 4). 
The Shiite community in Lebanon has been politically, socially, and economically 
marginalised by the traditional power-brokers (namely, Sunnis and Maronites) since the 
country’s inception in 1920 (Shanahan, 2005: Ch 1). The objective of Hizbullah was to 
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channel these feelings of injustice and deprivation by promising to regain the Shiites’ 
honour through the military resistance to Israel. Hizbullah encourages a sense of pride 
in enduring Israeli military offensives, and has provided an ideological outlet that 
counters the Shiite’s reputation as “second-class citizens” in Lebanon. In this sense, 
resistance to Israel is the repository of the Shiite community’s religious, cultural, and 
historical emotion. As a Shiite resident of south Lebanon said after the 2006 conflict, 
“We have the ability to suffer more than the Israelis. That has to do with our religion. 
Death is a habit for us” (Smiles, Sept 2006).   
 
The centrality of foreign policy in Hizbullah’s ideology and identity suggests that 
conflict directed at an external opponent can also be aimed at securing power 
domestically (Gat, 2006: 405). The conflict with Israel presents Hizbullah with the 
means to legitimately “contract out” the coercive activities needed to assert political 
order in its territory without damaging domestic support. An indication of a sub-state 
group’s military strength is its provision of internal order, in terms of eliminating rivals 
(such as the Lebanese authorities) and reducing criminal activity (Spears, 2004: 20). For 
example, the military authority of the Fuerzas Armades Revolucionarias de Columbia 
(FARC) rebels was demonstrated by a sharp drop in criminal activity – including 
murders, robbery and rape - in the weeks and months following its formal control of the 
southeastern regions of Columbia (Rohter, 1999: 14). Hizbullah’s tight grip on criminal 
activities within the Shiite community is demonstrated by a well-documented case in 
1994, when a 16 year old boy killed a woman and two of her children. The organisation 
arrested, tried, and executed the boy according to Islamic law - ignoring claims from the 
state that he should have been turned over to the Lebanese authorities (Raschaka, 1994: 
48). Hizbullah’s covert internal security organ also keeps security files on its members 
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and maintains reports on every individual or group who approaches them. This ensures 
domestic order and operational security8 (Hamzeh, 2004: 73-74). The Party of God’s 
ability to enforce internal order as well as implementing independent foreign policy is a 
fundamental feature of its state-like character. Not only does it protect its citizens from 
harm but it prevents internal rivals and strengthens its coercive function.   
 
Hizbullah emphasises security threats to the party, its constituents, and the country at 
large in order to maintain its status as the sole provider of “protection” in the south. 
According to Tilly (1985), groups who possess the monopoly of violence often 
simulate, stimulate, and sometimes fabricate external threats to increase support and 
justify the extraction of resources (1985: 171). The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 
2000 provoked calls from groups within Lebanon demanding the organisation disarm. 
To counter these threats Hizbullah emphasises the Israeli occupation of Shabaa Farms, 
the Lebanese (not necessarily Hizbullah) detainees held in Israel, and Israel’s efforts to 
infringe on Lebanon’s sovereignty in order to maintain its arms and thus its survival 
(Leenders, 2006: 45). Emphasising the need to “free” the Shabaa Farms is clearly an 
attempt by Hizbullah to appease domestic audiences and maintain its legitimacy as a 
“Lebanese” resistance force. This uninhabited piece of land on the Israeli occupied 
Syrian/Lebanese border (see Appendix 2) was thrust onto Hizbullah’s agenda (after 
nearly 40 years of neglect) after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. By using language of 
Lebanese territorial nationalism, Hizbullah has successfully inserted the Shabaa Farms 
issue onto the Lebanese agenda, and most importantly, deep into public consciousness 
                                                 
8 Hizbullah’s military success has been attributed to (among other things) its restraint in collaborating and 
mixing with the population. As an ex-Lebanese Military Intelligence officer admitted, “you can be a 
member of Hizbullah your entire life and never see a military fighter with a weapon. They do not come 
out with their masks off and never operate around people if they can avoid it. They’re completely afraid 
of collaborators. They know this is what breaks the Palestinians – no discipline and too much showing 
off” (in Prothero, 2006). 
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as Lebanese occupied land (Kaufman, 2006: 167-170). This gives the group free reign 
to maintain its arms and autonomy in south Lebanon. 
 
Hizbullah also sidestepped threats that it would be disarmed by emphasising the 
inexperience of the Lebanese military force and the strength of Hizbullah fighters. The 
Party of God objected to the government’s proposal to deploy the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) to the south in 2006 because deployment would be “placing the army in 
the mouth of a monster”. Nasrallah said, “When we objected or expressed reservations 
[for the deployment], we did not do so out of fear of the army… The truth is that we 
were afraid for the army” [emphasis added] (MEMRI, Aug. 15, 2006). Hizbullah’s 
emphasis on the continued threat of Israeli occupation serves two critical purposes. 
Resistance to Israel’s last remaining outpost in Lebanon justifies Hizbullah’s autonomy 
of coercion, while the occupation of the Shabaa Farms justifies the Lebanese 
government’s “refusal” to pursue Hizbullah’s disarmament because the organisation has 
not yet succeeded in liberating all of the country. Ultimately, the Shabaa Farms dispute 
acts as a cover for the Lebanese state’s refusal to do what it fears it cannot – disarm 
Hizbullah. 
 
Hizbullah’s ability to maintain an autonomous army is primarily due to the Lebanese 
government’s inability to confront the organisation. A state’s strength can be 
determined by its ability to expel or crush powerful sub-state groups within its borders 
(Tilly, 1975; Migdal, 1988). While Lebanon maintains a national security force, the 
LAF is unable to pose any serious threat to Hizbullah. The LAF numbers about 50,000 
troops, whereas Hizbullah fighters number only in the thousands. Despite this 
quantitative discrepancy, the Lebanese Army has limited fighting experience, lacks 
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professionalism and proficiency, and has unreliable and out-dated equipment. 
Hizbullah’s well-funded (due to Iranian financial support) and experienced combatants 
would be a significant threat to the LAF in the event of a clash (Berkovich, 2006). 
Likewise, the high percentage of Shiite soldiers in the national army reduces the 
likelihood of open conflict with Hizbullah. The LAF may be reluctant to test fragile 
sectarian loyalties and potentially dissolving the army by pitting Shiite against Shiite 
(Barak, 2006: 89). The absence of a Lebanese military force that is able and willing to 
defeat Hizbullah suggests that the organisation is in a favorable position to carry out its 
state building operations unhindered by the Lebanese state.  
 
While Hizbullah’s foreign policy is used domestically to stimulate support and 
demonstrate its military power, the group also utilizes non-violent methods internally to 
threaten the government and other rival sects. Hizbullah demonstrates its coercive 
strength as the largest political force in Lebanon through protests, mass rallies and other 
propaganda techniques. In 2004, Hizbullah led approximately half a million supporters 
onto the streets to protest the desecration of the holy sites in Iraq. The protest, which 
came two days before the municipal elections in the south, signaled the Lebanese 
population that the organisation had the numbers to democratically take control of the 
south - even if the electoral system prevented the Shiite from doing so (Alagha, 2007: 
56). After the 2006 war, Hizbullah responded to criticism by the “March 14”9 forces by 
withdrawing its two members from cabinet and staging protests in Beirut. In a speech 
aired on Hizbullah’s al-Manar television, Nasrallah said:  
 
If the [Hizbullah led] opposition wanted to topple the government, it would do so on the 
first day of its protests. The Lebanese opposition is capable of overthrowing the 
                                                 
9 The anti-Syrian multi-confessional coalition which orchestrated the 2005 “Cedar Revolution”;  
comprising of the Future Current led by Sunni leader Saad Hariri, the Progressive Socialist Party, led by 
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, as well as other anti-Syrian Christian factions, namely the Lebanese Forces. 
 44
Filling the Void: Hizbullah’s State Building in Lebanon 
government tomorrow, but what prevented it from doing so is its commitment to civil 
peace (Moqawama.org, Jan 2007).  
 
Even if Hizbullah makes no effort to use its army to threaten the Lebanese government 
directly, its capability to do so, as illustrated by its conflict with Israel, is inherently 
threatening (Nutter, 1994: 34). Hizbullah walks a fine line between displaying its 
coercive ability externally and demonstrating its strength through non-violent methods 
internally. Its ability to eliminate (or dampen) internal competition by displaying its 
coercive strength but not its force will therefore depend on the domestic pressure it is 
experiencing. If it does not encounter significant internal threats, then swaggering is 
sufficient. But if the organisation faces open conflict from groups within Lebanon, it is 
unlikely that it would refrain from using force. As a Hizbullah politburo member said, 
“We can make a revolution in Lebanon, we can occupy Lebanon, but this is not what we 
want” (Slackman, 2006: 26).  
 
Hizbullah’s Grassroots State building 
Relying on effective foreign policy to stimulate support and deflect criticism would not 
necessarily guarantee Hizbullah’s survival. The group therefore takes the further step of 
grassroots state building to solidify its autonomy and influence in Lebanon. Hizbullah’s 
social services and welfare agencies allow it broaden its support base (see footnote 4), 
legitimise its coercive functions, and institutionalise its state building practices in the 
areas of its control. Hizbullah has been the main provider of essential services to war-
ravaged areas across Lebanon since 1982. The organisation provides medical, financial, 
and housing facilities primarily to its Shiite followers, but also to other sectarian 
communities in Lebanon. Hizbullah has also built hospitals, civil defence centres, and 
supermarkets. These institutions, among others, employ thousands of people in regions 
that have poor employment opportunities and limited prosperity (Saouli, 2003: 6-7).  
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The activities of Hizbullah’s Social Unit (see Appendix 1) has contributed to the 
success of Hizbullah in boosting the size of its constituency and skillfully penetrating 
Lebanon’s society, particularly the Shiite community. Through its construction 
company Jihad al-Binaa (“Struggle for Rebuilding”), Hizbullah supplies approximately 
forty-five percent of Beirut’s southern suburbs’ water needs and provides maintenance 
to the government’s flailing power networks in the area (Hamzeh, 2004: 51). These 
social services and institutions are the foundation of Hizbullah’s popularity and cross-
sectarian support base. They also form the “sweetener” that softens the blow often felt 
by the group’s damaging foreign policy decisions. 
 
The aftermath of the 2006 war with Israel provides a clear example of the importance of 
Hizbullah’s state-like infrastructure and social services in gaining popularity and 
support. The organisation attempted to reinforce (or in some cases, regain) the 
allegiance of the Shiite after the 2006 war by distributing money and services that the 
government failed to deliver. Hizbullah distributed US$10,000 to $12,000 in cash to 
each family that lost its home during the thirty-four day offensive, totaling tens of 
millions of US dollars. Jihad al-Binaa has ear-marked US$450 million, donated by Iran, 
for reconstruction operations in the south (The Daily Star, May 25 2007). The US 
government has pledged one billion dollars to the Lebanese government to rebuild the 
war-damaged regions, however Hizbullah’s efficient and swift reconstruction efforts 
undercuts the government’s attempts to penetrate the south (Levitt, 2007: 4). When 
Nasrallah publicly announced Hizbullah’s relief and reconstruction efforts, he declared, 
“You will not have to ask for anyone’s help, you will not have to stand in queues or go 
anywhere… We cannot wait for the government and its heavy vehicles and machinery 
because they could take a while” (in Leenders, 2006: 51). By providing services, 
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welfare, and financial compensation to the war-ravaged areas in Lebanon Hizbullah can 
win back the legitimacy and respect it may have lost by sparking the 2006 hostilities.  
 
Hizbullah’s provision of services as a method of attracting support and loyalty is by no 
means a unique phenomenon. Hizbullah’s social welfare agencies are akin to the 
grassroots state making beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party (Perry, 1994: 162-
163). In fact, the similarities between Hizbullah and Marxist/Leninist principles of 
social interaction have been well noted. AbuKhalil (1991) contends that an “Islamised” 
version of Leninist ideology is the driving force behind Hizbullah’s provision of welfare 
and services. Whereas Leninist theory focuses on the struggle between the exploited and 
the exploiting classes, Hizbullah is motivated to serve “the downtrodden” (al-
mustad’afun) in contrast to “the arrogant ones” (al-mustakbirun) (1991: 395). 
Hizbullah’s identification of the Shiites as the oppressed does not stem from the Qur’an, 
but from the experiences of the Shiites in Lebanon. The Shiites have been politically, 
economically, and socially brushed aside by Lebanese non-Shiite elite, and Hizbullah 
has sought to increase its community’s confidence and self-esteem by improving their 
quality of life (Saad-Ghoreyeb, 2002: 18-19). In this sense, depravation and 
exploitation are the determining factors of Shiite oppression and thus the need for 
services and welfare - rather than poverty per se.  
 
The assumption that Hizbullah attracts only the poor and the poorly-educated is a 
common misconception of western scholars (Sambanis, 2004: 166-169). A survey 
conducted in 1993 found that forty-four percent of Shiite sampled of high socio-
economic status indicated affiliation with Hizbullah, while fifty-three percent of those in 
the medium and forty-seven percent of the low category were also Party of God 
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followers (Harik, 1996: 53-54). Recent data indicates a similar trend. In a 2002 survey, 
only ten percent of Shiites classified themselves a lower class. This indicates that the 
traditional conception of the Shiite as the underclass in Lebanon is no longer 
demographically correct (Hanf, 2003: 210-213). This data may raise questions of why 
Hizbullah continues to receive loyalty and support from people who are not dependent 
on its welfare or social services. The answer lies in the Party of God’s state building. 
The fact that Hizbullah helps people lead the “good life” by providing social 
infrastructure, employment, education, and public services indicates that the 
organisation aims to root itself in the hearts and minds of its constituents. Hizbullah’s 
survival rests on its ability to attract a wide support base and therefore its social policies 
are targeted at all the Shiites and the wider Lebanese community. 
 
Hizbullah’s Role as a Legitimate Political Party 
One of the most interesting, if not contradictory, facets of Hizbullah’s state making is its 
position as a legitimate political party in the Lebanese government. To evaluate 
Hizbullah’s political relationship with the state it is important to first understand the 
structure of the Lebanese political system and the Shiites’ position within it. The 
Lebanese political system is based on the consociational model, which endeavors to 
retain and legitimise sectarian cleavages as a means of achieving long-term stability. 
The consociational model deviates from democratic traditions of consensus by 
emphasizing the participatory rather than majoritarian nature of stable democratic rule 
(Yiftachel, 1992: 320). However, the consociational system tends to sharpen rather than 
reduce inter-group tensions, as it helps preserve primordial divisions rather than 
creating over-arching loyalty to the state (Yiftachel, 1992: 321). The Shiites’ 
underprivileged and underrepresented position in the Lebanese consociational system is 
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the fundamental political grievance within the community. Estimates suggest that the 
Shiites currently comprise of approximately forty percent of the population, yet they are 
limited to twenty-one percent of parliamentary seats and are barred from becoming 
President or Prime Minister (Shanahan, 2006: 2-3). Hizbullah’s decision to participate 
in national politics was driven to address these feelings of injustice and political 
isolation in the community. Within this framework, Hizbullah uses the parliament to 
represent the factional interests of the Shiite community and has little interest or 
motivation in broadening its objectives beyond its political support base.  
 
The decision for Hizbullah to join parliament in 1992 was fiercely debated by party 
leaders. The Islamic ideology of Hizbullah stipulated that any concession into secular 
politics was haram (unlawful), yet some leaders, including Secretary-General Nasrallah, 
recognised that gradual reformation was necessary for the party’s survival (Hamzeh, 
2004: 109). This move was quite unique for hard-line Islamist parties. Radical Sunni 
Islamist groups, such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, would find 
legitimating a secular, coreligionist government through overt participation 
ideologically impossible to accept (Early, 2006: 121). Yet the practically minded 
Hizbullah leadership decided it was better to influence the behaviour of the government 
from within the system rather than relegating itself exclusively to the outside. Political 
participation also broadened the organisation’s horizons beyond its military engagement 
with Israel, giving it an area to fall back upon should it succeed in its efforts – which it 
did in May 2000 (Early, 2006: 121). Hizbullah launched its first political program in 
1992 based on the following pillars: “(1) the liberation of the “Zionist” occupation; (2) 
the abolition of political sectarianism; [and] (3) amending the electoral law so that it 
will be more representative of the populace” (Alagha, 2007: 43). Pillars one to three 
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remain central to Hizbullah’s political program and, as will be discussed later, have 
even greater salience in the current political climate. 
 
Hizbullah’s decision to enter politics was widely supported by the Shiite community, as 
it offered hope for political empowerment and a slice of government resources. 
Participation in parliament in Lebanon is generally regarded as an opportunity to access 
muhassasat (allocations) in the form of government jobs, contracts, licenses, or permits 
that are normally distributed along sectarian lines (Norton, 2007: 101). By joining the 
parliament, Hizbullah had a greater opportunity to improve the Shiites’ position in the 
state. Hizbullah members lobby in parliament to ensure Shiite-dominated areas receive a 
fair share of government resources. Access to the decision making process also allows 
the group to block any unfavorable policies that might damage its autonomy in the 
south (Saidman et al, 2002: 106-107). This is demonstrated by Hizbullah’s use of 
propaganda, threats, and manipulation to justify its control over the means of coercion 
in the south. When Hizbullah received considerable domestic and international pressure 
to disarm after the 2006 war, Hizbullah withdrew its two members from Cabinet and 
collapsed the government (Fakhoury-Muhlbacher, 2007: 6-9). Effectively, the political 
arena has become yet another sphere for Hizbullah to further its state building 
enterprise. Rather than “Lebanonizing” the group into a watered-down version of its 
virulent self (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002; Norton, 2007), Hizbullah’s political participation 
allows it to keep a close eye on Lebanese rivals while pursuing its own political 
objectives. 
 
Hizbullah’s ability to respond to domestic challenges through political means is best 
demonstrated in the post-Hariri environment. The assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 
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February 14, 2005 and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005 have 
significantly changed the Lebanese political climate and Hizbullah’s position in the 
country. Without the presence of Syria to block harmful policies and internal criticism 
of the organisation, Hizbullah increased its presence in the public sphere to safeguard its 
arms and autonomy in the south. The May 2005 elections (the first parliamentary 
elections free of Syrian interference since 1972) led to the victory of the “March 14” 
alliance and the subsequent cooption of the Hizbullah into the coalition government. 
Hizbullah won fourteen (out of 128) seats in parliament and, for the first time in its 
history, fielded two (out of twenty-four) seats in Cabinet - claiming the Water and 
Energy portfolios (ICG, April 2005: 21). This new level of political participation 
marked a tremendous transformation for Hizbullah. It bolstered its image as a political 
(rather than “terrorist”) force in Lebanon and granted it greater legitimacy in the 
domestic and regional arenas. Hizbullah uses its political participation as a function of 
its state building. By protecting its interests, blocking unfavourable decisions, and 
manipulating existing tensions among internal rivals to suit its needs, Hizbullah can 
increase its position and power in Lebanon without using force. 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 6 ■ 
Legitimacy or Constraint? Democratic Effects on 
Hizbullah’s State Building 
 
 
he evidence presented in chapters four and five indicate that Hizbullah’s state 
building strategy is primarily motivated by domestic politics – it fills the void left 
by the weak Lebanese state and it champions the cause of the disenfranchised Lebanese 
Shiites. If Hizbullah’s internal and external dimensions of statehood are devoted to 
increasing its power in the domestic arena, then a number of important theoretical 
questions must be asked. First, how does Hizbullah fit into the definition of a “state-
building movement”? Second, what effects does Hizbullah’s state building have on its 
ability to achieve its aims? Finally, what does Hizbullah’s state building mean for the 
Lebanese state? This chapter will examine the centrality of domestic politics in 
Hizbullah’s state building by analysing the group’s sensitivity to domestic opinion, its 
desire for legitimacy, and its ultimate goals in Lebanon. In doing so, I will provide a 
nuanced analysis of Hizbullah as a state-building movement and illustrate the 
“democratic” state-like constraints it suffers as a result of its strategies. 
T 
 
Assessing Hizbullah’s Statehood in Lebanon 
Hizbullah can be described as a state-building movement because of the function it 
fulfills in Lebanese society and the strategies it uses to increase its power in Lebanon. 
Returning to Spears (2004) definition of states-within-states, I will evaluate the 
empirical aspects of Hizbullah’s state building. (1) The extension of force: Hizbullah 
maintains monopoly over the means of coercion in the south, and as a result, the state 
cannot viably challenge the group. (2) Territory: the dispersed nature of the Shiite 
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population means that Hizbullah is unable to enforce a well-defined border within 
Lebanon and therefore cannot safeguard its own territorial integrity. However, as the 
organisation has not indicated that it desires separation from the state (as will be 
discussed below), a contiguous territory is not essential for its state building process. (3) 
Capacity to generate revenue: generous funds from Iran shield Hizbullah from this 
requirement, but its businesses, investments, and alleged criminal activities generate 
considerable semi-independent revenue to satisfy this criterion. (4) Administration and 
infrastructure: Hizbullah’s well established infrastructure and administration is the 
“hardware” of its state building venture (2004: 17).  
 
Migdal’s (1988) social control indicators provide a further assessment of Hizbullah’s 
non-material state building qualities. State social control indicators - defined as 
compliance, participation, and legitimacy - determine the state’s ability to encourage the 
population to obey its rules over the rules of any other individual or group (Migdal, 
1988: 22-23). Applying the same indicators to Hizbullah illustrates that the organisation 
fulfills this state-based criteria and arguably outmatches the Lebanese state: 
Compliance: Hizbullah has unquestionable military superiority over the 
Lebanese state in southern Lebanon, and the state appears unwilling to compel the 
national army to challenge the group. 
Participation: Hizbullah is the largest political organisation in Lebanon and is 
composed of the country’s largest sectarian population. It also directly governs much of 
south Lebanon, the Becaa Valley, and southern Beirut (see Appendix 2). 
Legitimacy: the organisation has gained widespread respect for its political 
integrity and social generosity and has been responsible for the country’s liberation - a 
feat the state was unable to undertake.  
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The Limits of State Making: 
The Party of God’s empirical statehood helps it expand its support base and authority in 
the country. However, like a democratic state, Hizbullah’s state building strategy is 
embedded with “democratic” constraints that hamper its ability to achieve its goals. 
Hizbullah’s reliance on its constituency for resources, support, and legitimacy has 
created an “instrumental dependence” (Merom, 2003: 18) that restricts the group’s 
capacity to achieve its objectives in Lebanon. Hizbullah’s access to social networks and 
political institutions has provided the means to challenge government authority 
politically and socially, rather than purely coercively. However, these factors also 
prevent Hizbullah from utilizing coercive methods to increase its power. By relying on 
the support of the population to survive, Hizbullah cannot let the “cost” of supporting 
the group outweigh the “benefits”. In other words, Hizbullah walks a fine line between 
appealing to the population and alienating them by utilizing unpopular coercive 
methods. As Norton states, “A Trotskyite project of permanent revolution does not sit 
well with this constituency, and the Hizbullah leadership is nothing if not sensitive to its 
support base” (2000; 34). 
  
This issue is best illustrated by Hizbullah’s objective of implementing an Islamic state 
in Lebanon. During the civil war, Hizbullah imposed Islamic law upon the territory it 
controlled – banning the sale of alcohol and forbidding public dancing. The stringent 
rules bred widespread resentment among the more liberal-minded people of the 
territories that Hizbullah governed and it soon loosened its restrictive rule (Early, 2006: 
120). Hizbullah’s idea of a Lebanese Islamic state remains unpopular in post-war 
Lebanon. In a survey conducted in 1996, only twenty-four per cent of Hizbullah 
supporters would prefer the organisation implement a governmental system like the 
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Iranian Islamic republic (Harik, 1996: 53). Ever responsive to public mood, Hizbullah 
make no reference to a Lebanese Islamic republic in its 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 
and 2005 parliamentary and municipal election platforms (Alagha, 2007: 183). 
Conversely, Al-Qaeda’s recent drop in approval can be explained by its inability to 
respond to regional opposition to its hard-line advocacy of an Islamic supra-state. In a 
2005 poll conducted throughout the Middle East, only six percent of respondents 
supported al-Qaeda’s advocacy of an Islamic state (Telhami, 2006). Hizbullah’s 
responsiveness to public sentiment and its attention to the socio-economic aspects of the 
community (rather than the Islamic or the revolutionary) helps ensure its broad support 
base and internal legitimacy. 
 
Hizbullah is not only restricted by its own constituency in Lebanon but it must also 
mollify the (sometimes hostile) wider Lebanese community to ensure its survival. 
Hizbullah’s tense relationship with the non-Shiite political elite was largely dictated by 
Syria prior to 2005. Damascus ensured that Hizbullah did not become too politically 
powerful by setting a “Syrian ceiling” - an upper limit on how many Hizbullah 
candidates were permitted to compete in parliamentary elections (Norton, 2007: 102). 
Hizbullah has been freed from the restrictive presence of its benefactor since the Syrian 
withdrawal in 2005, but at the same time it has been exposed to greater criticism from 
within Lebanon. A 2005 poll indicates that sixty percent of Druze saw the disarming of 
Hizbullah as necessary for the country’s future, while one in seven Maronites and 
Sunnis agreed (Zogby Poll: March 7, 2005). Appeasing the non-Shiite communities is 
equally vital for Hizbullah as appeasing its own constituency. If the organisation does 
not successfully placate (or threaten) its internal rivals into submission, then it may be 
forced to use coercive methods to maintain its position as the most powerful political 
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party. This would consequently damage its domestic support and survival. Hizbullah’s 
preoccupation with legitimacy and maintaining support (or at least acceptance) from the 
wider Lebanese community indicates that the organisation is restricted in how it 
achieves its political goals. Striking a balance between state-like autonomy and its 
responsibility as a “Lebanese” (rather than Shiite) resistance group therefore prevents 
Hizbullah from openly challenging the Lebanese government. 
 
Grassroots Legitimacy and State Building 
Hizbullah’s focus on being regarded as “legitimate” in the domestic, regional, and to a 
lesser extent, international realms is a key component of its state building venture. 
Legitimacy is one of the fundamental mobilising factors in the Arab world (Hudson, 
1977: 393-394) and the Lebanese state’s lack of legitimacy provides room for Hizbullah 
to increase its own legitimacy and status. Once the state’s capacity to provide for the 
population diminishes and corruption becomes rife, citizens will be less likely to 
express loyalty to the state and its legitimacy plummets (Rotberg, 2003: 9). A 1995 
World Bank study among Lebanese expatiates concluded that, “there is a perception 
that corruption has become institutionalised in networks of protection, that the state 
behaves beyond the law, and that self-dealing, bribes and the bartering of favours and 
influence is customary” (Speetjens, 2005: 92). The integration of former warlords into 
the legitimate political system meant that the government became the agent of 
individual and sectarian financial interests rather than being accountable to citizens as a 
whole (Picard, 2000: 319). These factors have reduced the state’s legitimacy in the eyes 
of its citizens and have increased sectarian loyalties over that of the state.  
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In contrast, Hizbullah’s high quality and corruption-free institutions and its reputation 
as a reliable organisation have increased its legitimacy in the domestic sphere. As 
discussed earlier, Hizbullah’s social, educational, and health services have motivated 
the Shiites to transfer their allegiance from the state to the organisation. Yet Hizbullah’s 
reputation as the least corrupt political party is also accepted among those who disagree 
with its ideologies. Hizbullah media representative, Hussain Naboulsi, describes how 
Hizbullah eradicated corruption when it took over the Energy and Water portfolio in 
Cabinet: 
When we came to this ministry [energy and water], we saved at least $100 million per 
year. How? In the past there were influential figures [in Lebanon] who used to buy oil 
and then sell it to the government at a very high price. We said stop it. So we went to 
Kuwait and signed an agreement to receive oil directly from Kuwait to Lebanon. In that 
case, we saved $50 million. We have now established a new agreement with Algeria, 
and again, we save about $50 million (Naboulsi, 2005).  
 
Even during the chaos of the 2006 war, Hizbullah maintained its squeaky-clean image. 
After returning to his hometown in the south after the 34 day conflict, one Lebanese 
shopkeeper found that in the midst of their battles Hizbullah fighters had helped 
themselves to his stock of groceries – but they duly left receipts which he cashed for 
US$1000 at the party’s local office (The Washington Post, 18 August, 2006). In his 
examination of the “legitimacy problem” in the Middle East, Hudson (1977) found that 
the strongest type of legitimacy, structural legitimacy - defined as the reach of 
government capabilities to rural areas and the ability to perform service as well as 
extractive functions - is also hardest to attain (1977: 23, 391). Based on this assertion, 
Hizbullah’s high quality institutions and widespread service provision outstrips 
government functions in terms of practicality and legitimacy. Consequently, Hizbullah’s 
ability to structure a “legitimate” parallel state is increased.  
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Hizbullah is conscious of maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents and the 
wider Lebanese public and adapts its policies to preserve domestic authority. The Israeli 
occupation of the south (1982-2000) provided the organisation with the political and 
ideological justification for its monopoly of coercion in the south. Since the Israeli 
withdrawal, Hizbullah has sought to overcome domestic criticism by focusing on the 
protection of the Israeli-held Shabaa Farms, and the Lebanese prisoners in Israeli 
prisons (Saouli, 2003: 3). Hizbullah has deliberately marketed itself as the supreme 
defender of the national interest since the Israeli pullout. As Hizbullah representative 
Hussain Naboulsi said in a recent interview, “No other party can really care about 
Lebanon more than Hizbullah. If you want to know how much we are patriots, think of 
the blood we have spilled on the soil of Lebanon” (Naboulsi, 2005). Political leaders 
and parties in the Middle East also enhance their legitimacy by demonstrating their 
commitment to an all-Arab “core concern”, which is currently dominated by Palestine 
(Hudson, 1977: 5). Hizbullah’s current emphasis on the Palestinian issue is illustrative 
of this legitimising core-concern. In an interview with al-Jazeera television in 
November 2000, Nasrallah explained that Hizbullah sees itself as the “vanguard” 
(tali’a) of the Palestinian struggle and that the organisation refuses to distinguish 
between its roles in Lebanon and Palestine, let alone prioritise Lebanon’s interests 
(ICG, Nov 2002: 14). 
 
Hizbullah’s efforts to be perceived as a legitimate armed group are also evident in its 
diplomatic relations with the international community. In October 2002, Nasrallah 
accepted an invitation to the opening ceremony of the Beirut summit of French-
speaking states. This was the first time Hizbullah had attended an important 
international event that was not devoted to the conflict with Israel and is indicative of its 
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desire to be widely regarded as legitimate (Sobelman, 2004: 19). Hizbullah’s policy of 
“opening-up” (infitah) also included opening dialogue with the US. In 2005, Hizbullah 
party member and Minister of Labour and Agriculture, Trad Hamade, met senior 
members of the US Administration to discuss the UNSCR 1559 (which stipulates 
Hizbullah’s disarmament) (Alagha, 2007: 59-60). More recently, Hizbullah sent a 
delegation to a summit of Lebanese political leaders in France to deal with the post-
2006 war political deadlock. French Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained why 
France invited Hizbullah to the summit: “Hizbullah is an important political force in 
Lebanese life, and we therefore hope it is fully integrated in the political stakes” (The 
Daily Star, July 11, 2007). These moves by Hizbullah are illustrative of its efforts to be 
seen by the international community as a legitimate national organisation with a 
political and social agenda – not merely a “terrorist group”. 
 
However, the international dimensions of Hizbullah’s quest for legitimacy appear to be 
secondary to the domestic. This could be motivated by a desire not to isolate or 
antagonise its anti-west allies (Iran and Syria), and an effort not to undermine its own 
anti-western, anti-Israeli ideology. In comparison to the PLO, Hizbullah’s grassroots 
state building and its “Arab” identity grants it internal legitimacy and greater stability. 
The PLO’s state building involved adopting the norms and “rules” of the dominant state 
system to achieve international recognition and help to mobilise external (rather than 
internal) support. The Palestinian group made minimal efforts to gain widespread local 
backing, and subsequently the PLO became fragmented, decentralised and contested 
internally (Sayign, 2000: 204-206). Hizbullah, on the other hand, has made a 
considerable effort to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of its own constituency, the wider 
Lebanese community, and the region. This has enabled the group to increase its support 
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base and centralise its state-like structure. This comparison suggests that state-building 
movements that evolve to fill the void of a weak state are more likely to appeal to the 
grassroots and form stronger state-like structures. These state-building movements 
achieve much of the empirical attributes of states, and arguably have more domestic or 
grassroots legitimacy than the imposed political structure above them.   
 
State Building for What Purpose? 
It is difficult to evaluate the domestic motivations of Hizbullah’s state building without 
some discussion of its ultimate objectives. Does it desire to take over the state, and if so, 
how? Or is it content to exist in an autonomous zone separated from the state? The 
answers to these questions may be found in Lebanon’s history. During the civil war, the 
Lebanese militias, including Hizbullah, were motivated by either maintaining 
(Christian) or challenging (Muslim) the status quo. These goals would have been 
achieved by gaining control of the state and reordering the political relationship between 
communities. However, the symbiotic relationship between each militia, the (collapsed) 
state, and the Lebanese community meant that the militias did not attempt to separate 
from the state10 (Kingston & Zahar, 2004: 86). This trend is reoccurring with 
Hizbullah’s relationship with the state. Hizbullah’s main platform for the 2005 elections 
was to reform the electoral law to replace the power-sharing model with proportional 
representation (Alagha, 2007: 43). This would grant Hizbullah, as the largest political 
party in Lebanon, a greater role in Lebanese politics and therefore increased power and 
status in the country. Despite the fact that Hizbullah strives to maintain its military and 
social autonomy in the south, its reliance on the resources of the state, such as 
                                                 
10 Militias relied on the resources of the state to provide “sweeteners” to the population from which they 
required support and capital. These militias also had to negotiate with rival militias to ensure trade routs 
and access to infrastructure such as ports and airports (Kingston & Zahar, 2004: 85-87).  
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legitimacy, authority, and material resources suggest that it would be unlikely to attempt 
to separate from the state in an independent “Hizbullahland”. 
 
If Hizbullah does not aim to separate from the state, then its objectives must involve 
taking over the state – either by force or by democratically altering the balance of power 
in its favour. A possible cause for Hizbullah’s desire for a bigger slice of the Lebanese 
pie rather than its own sovereign region is the fact that “the state” is such an important 
entity in the Arab world. Unlike other regions in the developing world (such as Africa), 
the Middle East has experienced a “hardening” of the state system, whereby the state, 
even in its weak, oppressive and unrepresentative form, is “here to stay” (Korany, 1987: 
47). Recent polls indicate increased in loyalty to the state over ethnic or religious 
communities in the region. A 2005 poll saw a rise in the number of people in the Middle 
East who identify themselves with the state, and decline in those who identify 
themselves as Muslims first (Telhami, 2006). As demonstrated by the 
interconnectedness of militia groups, the community, and the state during the Lebanese 
civil war, strong political players in the Middle East have become heavily dependent on 
the resources of the state (Brynen, 1991: 607). In this context, Hizbullah’s aim of 
politically taking over the existing Lebanese state is motivated by a desire to gain access 
to state goods. Taking the state by force would jeopardise these resources and is 
therefore a less-favourable outcome. By utilizing a combination of pressure, threats, and 
political maneuvering, Hizbullah can “democratically” muscle-in on the state, secure 
access to state goods, increase its influence domestically and regionally, and improve 
the status of the Shiite community in Lebanon. 
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If Hizbullah aims to democratically take over the state, what impact with this have on 
Lebanon? Will the state be strengthened by Hizbullah’s state building efforts or will it 
be weakened? State building in 17th century Europe involved the obliteration or 
cooptation of weak political units into stronger, larger units (Tilly 1975: 83-85). If this 
process is applied to Hizbullah, then Lebanon may cease to exist and Hizbullah may 
become the “state”. However, the state building of post-1945 states is considerably 
different to that of 17th Europe. The most important difference is the strength of the idea 
of the sovereign state (Ayoob, 1995; Buzan 1991). It is inconceivable that “Lebanon” 
would cease to exist as an independent entity, and so Hizbullah could have to work 
within the Lebanese “framework” to increase its power. The optimistic view of 
Hizbullah’s challenge to the Lebanese state is that it would force the government to 
improve its state functions and win back the hearts and minds of the populous. The 
pessimistic view would see Hizbullah “stealing” the loyalty of citizens, undermining the 
cohesiveness of the Lebanese state, and potentially sparking the breakdown of the state - 
as seen in 1975. The process of state development in Europe would certainly indicate 
the pessimistic view of Hizbullah in Lebanon, but the significant differences in the 
modern state system may seriously alter the outcome of a sub-state group’s challenge to 
the sovereign state. The Party of God has significantly improved the lives of many 
Shiites, but at the same time, it reinforces the failure of the state and the destructive 
sectarian divisions in the country. Hizbullah’s state building is still in its relatively early 
stages, so only time will tell if it will force the Lebanese government to “step up to the 
plate”, or if it will render it defunct.  
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 Conclusion 
 
In some failed or weak states in the developing world, militarised sub-state groups 
challenge state authority by establishing parallel state-like structures that perform to a 
higher standard than the sovereign state. These “state-building movements” are 
important players in the domestic, regional, and arguably, international arenas, and yet 
they are not states. This phenomenon can be explained using the broad theoretical 
perspective of state making. The internal instability that is a feature of many new states 
is indicative of a process of early state formation. State formation in Europe involved 
the rise of some political entities at the cost of many others. State units must therefore 
crush internal rivals and monopolise the means of coercion in order to centralise control 
and assert authority on the population (Tilly 1975, 1985). This process has been 
hampered in many new states as the governing authority does not have the empirical 
attributes required to centralise control (Ayoob, 1995; Cohen et al, 1981). This has led 
to the development of internal, “organic” state-like structures that fill the void of the 
absent and ineffective state. 
 
This process is currently occurring in Lebanon with the powerful sub-state group, 
Hizbullah. The failure of the Lebanese state to provide for many of its citizens, its 
incapacity to wrest back the monopoly of the means of coercion after the civil war, and 
its inability to prevent internal and external interference has provided room for 
Hizbullah to develop into a state-building movement. The Party of God maintains its 
own army and has the monopoly of coercion in the south of Lebanon, it runs its own 
services and institutions, has established infrastructure and administration, and relies on 
its semi-autonomous economy. In fact, Hizbullah outmatches the Lebanese state in 
many of the empirical criteria of a state. 
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Hizbullah is a direct rival of the Lebanese government because of its state building and 
yet has (up to now) refrained from attempting to take over the state by force. This is due 
to the fact that Hizbullah’s state building is rooted in domestic politics – it has more to 
gain by “democratically” (and therefore “legitimately”) muscling-in on the state rather 
than draining state resources in an all-out confrontation. In this sense, Hizbullah is 
attempting to absorb the Lebanese state in a similar process of the strong obliterating or 
co-opting weak political units in 17th century Europe.  
 
Hizbullah’s State Building Revisited 
The key foreign policy instrument of Hizbullah’s state building is its monopoly of the 
resistance to Israel. The conflict with Israel provides Hizbullah with the means to build 
up, train, and professionalise its army, while at the same time providing the legitimacy 
for the organisation’s autonomy in the south and beyond. By emphasising the strength 
of Hizbullah fighters and the inexperience of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Islamic 
group can maintain its independent foreign policy and play a leading role in peace and 
war in the country. While the withdrawal of Israeli troops undermined Hizbullah’s 
legitimacy as an armed group, regional circumstances such as the Shabaa Farms 
dispute, the Palestinian conflict, and the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon have 
provided the pretext and freedom for Hizbullah to reinforce its military independence in 
Lebanon. On an ideological and political level, the resistance to Israel mobilises the 
Shiite population – whose support can be seen as the group’s most powerful weapon – 
and deflects any serious criticism from rival sectarian groups. Just as war has been 
described as the midwife of state making (Tilly, 1985), Hizbullah’s state building 
process is inextricably intertwined with its military struggle with Israel.  
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As this analysis has shown, Hizbullah’s pervasive autonomy and state building 
activities in the southern regions of Lebanon pose a direct challenge to the state’s 
authority, security, and legitimacy. The government’s mediocre military capabilities and 
the absence of government institutions in the south indicate that Hizbullah is in a 
favourable position to expand its state building at the cost of the Lebanese state. 
Hizbullah’s army has achieved a level of military capacity and tactical sophistication 
that outmatches the state’s counterpart. Likewise, Hizbullah’s success in maintaining 
external alliances, penetrating the political realm, and displacing the state as the primary 
service provider is further indicative of its strength as a state-building movement. 
Importantly, the availability of financial and other assistance from external sources 
(such as Iran and Syria) has lessened the need for Hizbullah to engage in struggles with 
domestic actors (including the Lebanese state) to extract revenue for state building. 
These factors illustrate that Hizbullah is in a favourable position to further undermine 
the Lebanese government’s legitimacy through its state building activities.  
 
The roots of Hizbullah’s success are deep in the fabric of Lebanon’s state and society. 
Hizbullah owes much of its appeal to the fact that it has been able to outstrip the 
government in the delivery of social services in Muslim-dominated areas. By providing 
health care, education, welfare, and employment, Hizbullah has established a broad 
constituency and has won the hearts and minds of the Shiite (and in some cases, non-
Shiite) population. Many Shiites have subsequently transferred their allegiance to 
Hizbullah rather than the state - which is seen as corrupt and unrepresentative of their 
needs. This support legitimises Hizbullah state building and provides the fuel to 
challenge the government through social and political rather than coercive means. The 
Party of God’s state-like infrastructure also underlines and enhances its legitimacy as a 
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bona fide Lebanese political and social party, rather than a “terrorist” or insurgent group. 
Hizbullah has essentially won a grassroots struggle with the state. Its services, 
infrastructure, and administration undercut government authority and provide fuel for 
the necessary support for its state building venture. 
 
Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
What does this mean for both Hizbullah and international relations theory? The first 
theoretical implication of this study is the importance of sub-state units as providers of 
“the good life” in new states. The suggestion that actors from the “periphery” are much 
more important than many scholars give them credit for is highlighted by a number of 
authors (Kingston & Spears, 2004; Lister & Wilder, 2005, Migdal, 2001). However, I 
contend that many have not gone far enough. While armed sub-state groups can be 
theorised as insurgent groups that aim to disrupt, takeover, or separate from the state, 
Hizbullah occupies a political, social, and military position that extends far beyond any 
traditional definition of sub-state groups. The symbiotic relationship between the 
organisation and its populous is closer to that of a state than an insurgent group or social 
movement and therefore Hizbullah can be best understood as a state-building 
movement. Hizbullah’s state making is illustrative of its desire to alter the balance of 
power in the country rather than splitting from the state in the form of “Hizbullahland”. 
By creating facts on the ground, Hizbullah can muscle-in on state resources, increase its 
strength and support base, and express its legitimacy as a Lebanese party. State-building 
movements such as Hizbullah challenge the Weberian understanding of the “state” by 
their sharp and favourable contrast to the “judicial states” in the developing world.  
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Some would argue that Hizbullah cannot be understood as a state-building movement 
because it does not satisfy some of the requirements of the sovereign state. For example, 
one of the fundamental features of the Weberian state is the ability to define and secure 
its borders over a relatively homogenous population. As discussed in chapter three, the 
rural migration that occurred in Lebanon in the 1960-1970s led to the dispersal of the 
Shiites from the south and the Becaa Valley to the southern suburbs of Beirut. The 
Shiite population remains dispersed and thus the lack of homogenous territory would 
prevent Hizbullah ever becoming an actual “state” in the Weberian sense (Kingston & 
Zahar, 2004: 86-87). Generous financing from Iran also shields the groups from the 
Weberian requirement of providing services in exchange for taxation (to fund war 
activities). While Hizbullah may not satisfy all the characteristics of a Weberian state, 
the same could be said of other states in the developing world. Many new states lack 
many of the marks and merits that make up sovereign statehood. This suggests that 
traditional theoretical understandings of the “state” are not necessarily indicative of 
post-1945 states. 
 
The Future of Hizbullah 
How then does the theoretical and empirical evidence provided in this thesis assist in 
anticipating Hizbullah’s trajectory in Lebanon? The difficulty in studying Hizbullah’s 
challenge to the Lebanese government is that the group rarely indicates what its 
objectives in Lebanon really are. Unlike insurgent groups who seek to either take over 
or separate from the state, Hizbullah’s state building requires it to play the “political 
game” – in which the group uses the propaganda tools of “national unity” rather than 
discussing “Hizbullahland” (Zisser, 2000: 10). Hizbullah’s political objective of 
replacing the consociational system of government with a majoritarian one indicates 
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that the organisation intends to alter the balance of power in its favour. Up to now, this 
objective has been focused on non-coercive methods, but recent regional changes may 
give Hizbullah the opportunity to overtly challenge the government. Hizbullah’s 
increased operational freedom brought about by the Syrian withdrawal has allowed it to 
take to the political stage with determination and purpose. Its greater role in government 
shields Hizbullah from international interference while at the same time helps to deflect 
any serious internal political challenge. It is as yet unclear what effect the 2006 conflict 
with Israel will have on Hizbullah’s operational freedom and willingness to use 
coercive tactics to improve its position in Lebanon. In November 2006, Secretary-
General Nasrallah told an audience of over 7,000 that:  
 
The current government will have to go and will be replaced by a pure government that 
will help you [the people of South Lebanon] to repair the damage caused by Israeli 
aggression…. The current government is disloyal, since it knew about the [Israeli] 
aggression in advance, and asked them to prolong their aggression… This government 
will not stay in power. We will form a new government (MEMRI, Nov 21, 2006). 
 
  
Perhaps the group is merely waiting for the right moment to launch a political attack on 
the government with the hope of gaining power through legitimate, democratic means. 
On the other hand, the inherent threat in this speech suggests that the organisation may 
use coercive methods of achieving its aims if it feels strong enough. What is clear, 
however, is that Hizbullah’s challenge to the government - in whatever form it may take 
in the future - is a significant threat to the Lebanese state. Unless Lebanon improves its 
military capacity and reinstates government institutions in Hizbullah-dominated regions, 
it is unlikely the government will have the strength to overcome Hizbullah. The first step 
toward undermining Hizbullah might be to remove the organisation’s justification for its 
monopoly of coercion in the south. If Israel unilaterally withdrew from all Lebanese 
territories Hizbullah would be in a very weak domestic position to justify its autonomy 
of arms. In the same respect, a peace treaty with Israel and Hizbullah’s logistical 
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supporter Syria, could spell the end of the group as a formidable armed movement. 
However, as this thesis has shown, Hizbullah is a domestic actor focused on Lebanese 
objectives. The best way to counter Hizbullah would therefore be to attack its state-like 
Achilles Heel – its legitimacy. As chapter six demonstrates, Hizbullah is very conscious 
about maintaining domestic legitimacy. Removing the factors that provide the 
organisation with legitimacy – such as its social services and its resistance to Israeli 
occupation – could be the only successful method of de-clawing the group. Lebanon will 
have to crack down on corruption, replace Hizbullah institutions with state-run ones, and 
win back the loyalty of the people if it ever hopes to neutralise Hizbullah. Whatever the 
Lebanese government’s strategy, it is likely that the Party of God will have the starring 
role in the next chapter of the Lebanon’s history. As Hizbullah spokesman Hussien 
Naboulsi states, 
 
When the whole world was against us we were few, we were steadfast, 
determined, and we saw real hope that we would win one day. The time came 
when we won. Now, only part of the world is against us and we are even 
stronger – we are now a big society, and we are now represented in the 
Parliament. They couldn’t defeat us when we were weak, can they defeat us 
when we are strong? (Naboulsi, 2005). 
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Appendix 1: Hizbullah’s Organisational Structure 
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Source: Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah, New York: Syracus 
University Press (2004), pp. 46. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis’, Crisis Group Middle East 
Report N°69, 10 October 2007, pp: 25.  
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Appendix 3: Transcript of interview with Director of Hizbullah Media 
Relations, Hussein Naboulsi 
Beirut, Monday November 21, 2005 
 
 
From Hizbullah’s point of view, do you think there has been a significant change in 
Lebanon since the death of Rafiq Hariri? 
 
There has been a big change, a big, big change. We have seen the end of the Syrian 
mandate in Lebanon, people are very happy. But now we have a problem because the 
region is on the edge on explosion. Hariri’s death was a real turning point in Lebanon, a 
real earthquake. When Bashir Gemayal [former President of Lebanon during the end of 
the civil war] was assassinated, people were in shock. But when Hariri died, it was 
devastating for the country. He was a national figure, very wealthy and an international 
figure.  
 
How do you think the withdrawal of Syria will affect Lebanon? 
 
The whole region is shaking because Syria has been accused of killing Hariri. The US 
and the UN have told Syria to comply to the needs of the investigation, but what if they 
don’t comply? There could be problems for Lebanon because we are so near to Syria. 
Lebanon used to be the ones being watched – but now we are the ones doing the 
watching. 
 
Do you think that there is a chance for a return to internal violence in Lebanon? 
 
Because Lebanon is a sectarian society, and because every sect depends on another 
country to survive, there is no real trust in Lebanon. Because if there is no trust, it 
means that there is no real unity. I think now that those big countries that had interest in 
Lebanon, or they has interest in waging war between the Lebanese for the sake of Israel, 
so that Israel can be secure, there is no indication that those countries are in the mood to 
make another war in Lebanon. Their priorities are different and I think most countries 
priority is the region, and I think in particular, Syria. 
 
The circumstances for war in 1975, do not exist in 2005. On top of that, there is no real 
major party in Lebanon that can wage war against another party. Secondly, if you went 
to every Lebanese party, they would tell you that we have learned a lot from our past. A 
new war is not going to happen anymore – we might have political fights, but not 
military fights at all. 
 
War in Lebanon is in the interest in Syria because if there is a war in Lebanon it means 
that Syria can interfere again. Now the priorities are totally different, and Lebanon is no 
longer the focus. Lebanon could be the base, could be the reason, could be the cause, 
but its not going to witness any new kind of civil war in Lebanon.  
 
Has the Syrian withdrawal impacted Hizbullah a great deal? Has the structure of the 
party changed since it withdrawal, and so they still support you from abroad? 
 
The problem is that when they speak about Hizbullah, and the relationship between 
Hizbullah and Syria, they think Hizbullah is a toy in Syrian hands. This is not the case 
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at all. We have a very strong structure, we have a very strong leader, we have very 
strong independent decisions. And we know the Lebanese interests, we know the 
regional interests and we know the Lebanese arena very well and we know how to 
behave and play in a very wise way. When we say the interests, we do believe that it is 
in the best interests of Lebanon to have an excellent relationship with Syria. We believe 
that now the region is facing a new conspiracy from Israel and America, to undermine 
the last stronghold that says no to Israel and no to America. 
 
The main issue in the American agenda is Syria and Hizbullah; more specifically it is 
Hizbullah. I tell you, after 9/11, they came to us, mediators sent by the Americans. They 
told us; “this is a blank check”, it was a tempting offer… “fill it, any number, billions of 
dollars. We want only something from you; we want a small piece of paper saying that 
we are going to stop fighting Israel.  
 
Did they want you to disarm completely or just to stop the attacks? 
 
Just to back off and we can have as much as we want in Lebanon; ministers, blah blah 
blah. Secretary General [Nasrallah] stood up and said, “we are not going to betray the 
blood of our martyrs”, and the meeting was over. It was very swift, he gave them a very 
prompt answer, but the next time they came to us, you know what they said? They said, 
“ok, this is two billion dollars, we only want something from you, don’t use your 
rockets”. This is real!! Don’t use your rockets against Israel. The answer was negative, 
as usual.      
 
Before the Syrian withdrawal (and this was said by Hassan Nasrallah and recently by 
Bashar Assad), he said, the Americans came to him and told him [Assad] that you are 
free to stay in Lebanon as much as you like, but disarm the resistance.  So he took the 
other decision, and he withdrew from Lebanon and he told us what the Americans asked 
him to do. America doesn’t really care about independence, sovereignty, prosperity, 
development, they only care about one important thing – Israel. Now they think, ok, if 
Syria had agreed to disarm Hizbullah, we wouldn’t see [UN Security Council 
Resolution] 1559.  
 
So this discussion between Assad and the Americans must have taken place in early 
2004? 
 
Yes it was before 1559. So now Syria is now facing the international community 
because of one thing; because of the resistance. So its very normal that we, Hizbullah, 
became allied to Syria and we are not behaving according to our interests. We are 
widely thinking for the best interests of Lebanon. As I said before, it is in our best 
interests to make the best relations with Syria. When you see a country that is willing to 
face the international community because of the resistance, we have to do the least we 
can towards this country. Establish excellent relations with Syrian instead of launching 
a war of words against Syria for the sake of America or Israel. I tell you, America never, 
never, never has the interests of any country. It only cares about itself and Israel.      
 
But could you say that Syria acts with its own interests as well? 
 
I think that within the Syrian leadership there are certain priorities. One of those 
priorities is to protect Syria and the resistance in Lebanon from any enemy from 
outside, especially from Israel and America. Of course, like any country, it has many 
priorities on its agenda, once you see that this item is on the top of the agenda, you can 
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feel secure that those people are working for the real sovereignty and independence of 
both countries. Assad said it very clearly, “we have made mistakes in Lebanon”, and 
they have made mistakes in Lebanon they were not angels and they had many corrupt 
figures in Lebanon, but this has nothing to do with the strategic planning – the real 
agenda. If Lebanon can stand strongly on the side of Syria we can see America backing 
off and they can do nothing. America is using the Lebanese arena to construct 
conspiracies against Syria. This is very clear, I think.  
 
We have to be real men and think in a very wise way; if some believe that it’s time to 
end the Syrian influence in Lebanon by depending on the American power, I think it is a 
mistake. We would end the Syrian influence and bring the American influence. And we 
don’t think America cares about any country, and I tell you, if there was no oil in the 
Gulf, so you think American would care about Gulf States, of course not!  
 
So lets bring it back to Lebanon, Hizbullah did well in the recent elections, can you tell 
me more about that and how this has changed Hizbullah’s role? 
 
First of all, the electoral law in Lebanon doesn’t meet the needs of the Lebanese. We 
believe that the best way for all the Lebanese to be represented in the parliament is 
using proportionate representation law. That means that if you and I were competing in 
the elections, and you got 60 and I got 40, you win and I win. In this law, if you get 51 
and I get 49, you win and I lose. Proportional representation means all Lebanese get 
represented. Hizbullah believes that Lebanon should be one circle. That means that I 
can vote for an MP in Tripoli [in the north], and a man in Tripoli can vote for an MP in 
the south. This way we can make parties so parties can compete, not sects. Which is the 
best way, but they say, we want proportionate representation but lets make it in the 
province, not the country.      
 
The issue is that we still have sectarian mentality. And a sectarian mentality will never 
allow prosperity and development. We are weak like this – in the cabinet we fight, it is 
as if five or six countries met in the cabinet and each had its own agenda. It is really 
stupid. If you really want to make Lebanon strong and united, how is this possible when 
we don’t even agree on the priorities?  
 
We, the Lebanese, as individuals, great! As individuals we go outside Lebanon and we 
are the best, most successful businessmen in the world. We have large communities 
wherever you go. The Lebanese think like the individual; it is my family, my village, 
my town. Even in one building, for example, as you know, Lebanese are really clean 
and neat blah blah blah, they care a lot about their look etc, but in one building, 
everyone cares about their own apartment and they don’t care about the communal areas 
like the stairs or the elevators. This is part of our mentality. Instead of cleaning the 
communal areas that would benefit all of us, we only care about ourselves. As 
individuals Lebanese are warm and friendly and hospitable, but when it comes to 
collective work, I don’t know what happens! 
 
 
So you have never learnt to work together? 
Exactly. Lebanese are really strong as individuals, but not as groups. 
 
Ok, there are parties inside Lebanon who are calling Hizbullah to disarm, so you think it 
would be a step in the right direction for Hizbullah to disarm and become a complete 
political party and join Lebanon, so to speak. 
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No other party can really care about Lebanon more than Hizbullah. If you want to know 
how much we are patriots, think of the blood we have spilled on the soil of Lebanon. 
We have sacrificed our martyrs in order to protect and liberate Lebanon. Fighting and 
resisting is not a picnic – you have death waiting for you. In order to choose this path, 
you must be real strong, faithful and have trust in God. You must be loyal to your 
country. A mercenary cannot do such a thing. You have to have that faith and that belief 
that you are working for your country. When others were in France enjoying themselves 
on the beach in Niece, or walking the cornich in Geneva, we were down in the south 
fighting for a cause. They were waiting for us to liberate Lebanon and then come back – 
it’s a hotel, Lebanon is hotel to them.    
 
When others were fighting each other in the civil war, Hizbullah had no part in the civil 
war. If the resistance did not exist, what would happen to Lebanon? It would be under 
Israel control. After the liberation, everyone became proud to say we are Lebanese. 
 
To try and achieve this unity that Lebanon desperately needs, do you think it’s 
important for Hizbullah to relinquish some of its social power and responsibility and 
allow the Lebanese government to step in? For example, rather than disarming, having 
a Hizbullah battalion in the south, but one that has a national stamp on it? 
 
First of all, we are not a visible military presence – there is a presence of Lebanese 
Army and security forces. In the past when we talked about national history, we have 
taught the whole world a new experience. Our experience is the connection between 
resistance, people and government. This equation worked in Lebanon successfully, so 
why should we relinquish it. 
  
But based on what you were saying earlier, which is that Lebanon has never 
experienced such a change as it has in 2005, do you agree that it is perhaps time for 
Hizbullah to change also? 
 
There are things that have changed not in Lebanon, not in the region, but in the whole 
world, but we did not change. Not because we are stubborn, but because we believe in 
our cause and we think we are right. We are behaving in accordance with the UN 
charter that gave us the right to defend ourselves. We are abiding by the international 
law. 
 
Well now that Israel has withdrawn and is no longer in Lebanese territory, couldn’t you 
argue that maintaining the resistance is actually going against international law?   
 
The UN has nothing to do with when two countries agree on something. The UN only 
has to bless such a thing. The Lebanese and Syria have agreed from the very beginning 
that the Shabaa Farms [a contested region at the border of Syria, Lebanon and Israel] 
belong to Lebanon. The Israelis have withdrawn from Lebanon, but they left Shabaa 
Farms under occupation. If they really want us to stop fighting them, they should end 
their occupation of the Shabaa Farms. So we are going to continue like this – abiding by 
the international law and we are not going to abandon the legitimate way of our 
activities; we don’t have any branches outside Lebanon as some accuse us, we don’t 
have any activity outside the border of Lebanon at all. From the very beginning to this 
moment we are focussing on one thing; the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. And because 
of that, we succeeded.  
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It seems that Hizbullah has done all that it can to distance itself from Lebanese 
politicians, but do you think that now the time has come to merge all Hizbullah with the 
rest of the Lebanese community? 
 
When we joined the government recently, we hold two posts, the Energy and Water 
Ministry, and the Labour Ministry, I remember a journalist from AL-Jezeera call me 
and saying, ‘oh, good news, at least we wont see stealing in these ministries.’ They 
know that we are clean. When we came to this ministry [energy and water], we saved at 
least $100 million per year. How? In the past there were influential figures who used to 
buy the oil and then sell it to the government at a very high price. We said stop it; so we 
went to Kuwait and signed an agreement to receive oil directly from Kuwait to 
Lebanon. In that case, we saved $50 million. We have now established a new agreement 
with Algeria, and again, we save about $50 million.  
 
So where do you see Hizbullah’s future? 
 
In the past we were few people, and the whole world was against us – we were not even 
accepted in Lebanon. And we reached a point, that in 1993 when the whole world 
decided to eradicate us, and the same in 1996 during the Grapes of Wrath, the more they 
attack us and aspire against us, the more we become stronger and stronger and stronger. 
When the whole world was against us we were few, we were steadfast, determined, and 
we saw real hope that we would win one day. The time came when we won. Now, only 
part of the world is against us and we are even stronger – we are now a big society, we 
are now represented in the parliament. So they couldn’t defeat us when we were weak, 
can they defeat us when we are strong?    
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